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DIFFERING  IMPLICIT  assumptions regarding the response of the aggregate 
price level to changes in aggregate  demand underlie  many of the most 
important  disputes in the field of macroeconomics,  both at the abstract 
level of theoretical  discussion  and at the practical  level of policy recom- 
mendation.  When aggregate  demand  shifts in either  direction,  so does the 
"market-clearing"  aggregate  price level at which output remains  fixed. A 
"perfectly  flexible"  actual  price level shifts instantaneously  to the market- 
clearing  level in response  to a shift  in demand,  but an "imperfectly  flexible" 
price level changes only gradually  toward the market-clearing  level, thus 
allowing  real output  to vary in the same direction  as the demand  shift dur- 
ing the transition  to complete  price adjustment. 
The resolution  of several  important  issues depends  on the speed of price 
adjustment: 
1. Some  have applied  the theory  of rational  expectations  to stabilization 
policy  to conclude  that the monetary  authority  cannot  affect  real output  by 
systematic  policy reactions  if these depend  in a regular  way on past events 
and thus can be anticipated  by economic  agents.'  This conclusion  depends 
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for its validity on the perfect  flexibility  of prices; when prices are imper- 
fectly flexible,  firms and workers  will be constrained  from selling all the 
goods and labor they want to sell at the actual price and wage level even 
though  they know the precise  path of the money supply  this year; and the 
monetary  authority  thus retains  control of real output even in the face of 
perfect  knowledge  of its actions.2 
2. When  policymakers  inherit  an inflation  rate well above the optimum, 
as in 1969-70,  they must compare  the long-term  benefits  of lower inflation 
with the short-run  costs of the recession  required  to bring  it about.3  Infla- 
tion can be eliminated  instantaneously  without recession  when the aggre- 
gate price level is perfectly  flexible, but the recession that occurs with 
imperfect  flexibility  may  impose  short-run  costs sufficient  to restrain  policy- 
makers from attempting  to reduce inflation all the way to its optimum 
rate.4 
3. The optimal  response  of policy  to a supply  shock  such  as the increased 
oil prices of 1974 is a reduction  in the rate of monetary  growth if other 
prices are perfectly  flexible and an increase  if these prices are absolutely 
rigid.5 
4. The extra  inflation  that would be associated  in 1976-77  with the tem- 
porary  but substantial  monetary  acceleration  recommended  by many non- 
monetarist  commentators  could range from substantial  to negligible,  de- 
pending  on the short-run  response  of prices  to higher  aggregate  demand.6 
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Aims  of the Paper 
The basic  aim of this paper  is to look inside  the "black  box" model that 
relates  prices  to aggregate  demand  in an attempt  to isolate  the relative  size 
of the demand  effect on particular  sectors of final demand.  In contrast  to 
most recent empirical  work on inflation,  which has concentrated  on the 
size and stability  of coefficients  in the wage equation  (1 below), this paper 
concentrates  on a reexamination  of the price equation for final output (3 
below). The following  questions  are addressed: 
1. Given the behavior of wages, is there any evidence  that the rate of 
change  of prices  of final output  in the U.S. economy  depends  on aggregate 
demand?  Or is the finding  by Nordhaus  and Godley for the United King- 
dom that "demand  did not contribute  in either  a systematic  or a significant 
way .  .  after normal  cost changes  were accounted  for"7  also true for the 
United States? 
2. Is there  any evidence  that the response  of prices  to changes  in aggre- 
gate demand, again given wage rates, has weakened  during the postwar 
period,  thus increasing  the length and severity  of the recession  required  to 
achieve  a given reduction  in the rate of inflation?8 
3. Does the "standard"  cost that is marked  up by businessmen  include 
capital  as well as labor costs?  Is there  any evidence  that changes  in any or 
all of the three main components  of capital cost-interest rates, tax rates 
and credits,  and the relative  price of investment  goods-cause  changes  in 
the price of final output? 
4. How does a reduced-form  relationship  between  the rates  of change  of 
prices and the money supply perform, in comparison  with a structural 
markup  equation  in which  wages  are exogenous?  Is the effect  of money on 
prices  instantaneous,  as required  by the rational-expectations  literature,  or 
does it operate  with a long lag? 
5. Do disaggregated  equations  confirm  earlier  results  that the U.S. price 
7. William D.  Nordhaus and Wynne Godley, "Pricing in the Trade Cycle," Eco- 
nomic  Jouirnal,  vol. 82 (September  1972), p. 873. 
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controls of 1971-74 significantly  reduced  prices relative  to wages?9  If so, 
did the controls have this effect across the board or only in particular 
sectors? 
6. Does disaggregation  provide  benefits  that outweigh  the costs of data 
collection  and equation  specification?  Do the disaggregated  price  equations 
either fit the sample period or forecast beyond the sample period better 
than does a single aggregate-price  equation? 
7. Finally, does the unprecedented  price experience  of  1974, with an 
average  annual rate of increase  in the private  product  deflator  during  the 
year of 11.9 percent,  demonstrate  that time-series  econometrics  has failed 
to provide a stable and reliable  explanation  of the inflation  process?  Or, 
rather,  is it possible  to explain  the events of the past few years with equa- 
tions estimated  for a time period  ending in mid-1971? 
Price Flexibility  and Wage Inflexibility 
The flexibility  of the aggregate  price  level (P) depends  on the degree  of 
price flexibility  in the three major submarkets  for labor, crude commodi- 
ties, and final output.  The process  of price  adjustment  in the economy  may 
be described,  first, by an "expectational  Phillips  curve"  wage equation: 
(1)  Wt  = pI,  +  a(Zt),  a(0) =  0. 
Here and in what  follows,  variables  designated  by lower-case  letters  denote 
percentage  rates of change. Thus, wg and pet  are, respectively,  the current 
rate  of change  of the wage  rate  and of the expected  price  level, and  Zt is the 
current  excess  demand  for labor. Second,  changes  in the price  of crude  ma- 
terials,  vt, relative  to the expected  general  price  level  (Vt  -  pt), may depend 
on the excess demand  for commodities,  X,: 
(2)  vt-Pt  =  b(Xt),  b(O)  =  0. 
Finally, neglecting productivity change and indirect taxes, the rate of 
change of prices of final output can be written as the weighted average 
change  in factor  costs, which  here  are confined  to wages  and costs of crude 
materials,  plus the rate of change  of the markup  over factor  cost, which  in 
turn is assumed  to depend  on the rate of change  of the excess demand  for 
commodities: 
(3)  Pt  =  Ciwt +  (1  -  Ci)Vt  +f(Xt),  f(0)  =  0. 
9. Robert J. Gordon, "The Response of Wages and Prices to the First Two Years of 
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Adding the assumption  that the expected rate of inflation is determined 
adaptively, 
(4)  Pt = dpt  + (1 -d)p'- 
permits  solving for the actual rate of inflation  as a function  of two sets of 
predetermined  variables,  the expected  rate of inflation  in the previous  pe- 
riod, and the excess demands  for labor and commodities: 
cia(Zt) +  (1 -  cl)b(Xt)  + f(Xt) 
(5)  1---P-I+-Id 
Even if the short-run  Phillips  curve for wages were completely  flat, with 
the slope of the a(Zt) function equal to zero, the overall response of the 
price  level to a change  in aggregate  demand  might  nevertheless  be substan- 
tial if the slopes of the b(Xt)  andf(X,) functions  were steep enough. Some 
commentators  have argued  that the downward  rigidity  of wage  rates  means 
that restrictive  monetary  policy can cause a very deep and long recession 
with little downward  adjustment  of prices,  neglecting  entirely  the possible 
impact  of demand  on prices  of crude  materials  and on the margins  between 
prices  and factor costs.'0 
The Theory  of Markup  Pricing 
The optimal long-run price net of indirect taxes for a "neoclassical" 
profit-maximizing  firm  in a closed economy  has been shown by Nordhaus 
to be based on factor cost:" 
(6)  (1 -  Tr')Pt  -  MQ  'Nta1Wta2Vt(1-al-a2), 
10. See especially  Tobin's 1974 simulations, in which the downward  response of the 
inflation rate is based entirely on the adjustment coefficient in the wage equation- 
a(Zt)-with  no allowance at all for an effect of demand on the prices of crude and final 
commodities. James Tobin, "Monetary Policy in 1974 and Beyond," BPEA, 1:1974, 
pp. 219-32. 
11. William D.  Nordhaus, "Recent Developments in  Price Dynamics," in  Otto 
Eckstein,  ed., The Econometrics  of Price Determination,  A Conference  Sponsored  by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Social Science Research 
Council (Board of Governors, 1972), equation 28, p. 29, with time subscripts and the 
indirect  tax term added here. 
The particular  form of 6 assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function with con- 
stant returns to scale. As Nordhaus points out,  an important limitation of  6 is  the 
unrealism  of the underlying demand function for industries that are neither monop- 
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where 
-= the indirect  tax rate 
P  =  the sales price 
Q = index of neutral  technical  change 
N  =  the price of capital  services 
W =  the price of labor 
V  the price of raw materials 
M  =  a scale term 
a1l a2  =  share  of capital  and of labor, respectively,  in total sales. 
The coefficient  on materials  cost would be zero if 6 were applied  to an 
aggregate  closed economy and greater than zero for a subsector of the 
economy or an economy  with material  imports.  Nordhaus  notes three  im- 
portant  differences  between  6 and price  equations  that are often fitted  em- 
pirically.  First, a 1 percent  increase  in the wage rate should cause an in- 
crease  in the price  level net of taxes of only a2 percent,  where  a2 is the share 
of the wage bill in total sales, in contrast  with the higher  long-run elastici- 
ties found in many  empirical  tests. Second,  the service  price  of capital  is an 
important  component  of price, which has typically  been excluded  in em- 
pirical tests. Finally, the optimal-pricing  rule in 6 does not, in general, 
coincide with an equation that embodies "target  return"  markup  pricing 
except when markets  are competitive. 
The Nordhaus  formulation  in 6 can be rewritten  in a form more conve- 
nient for estimation.  First,  the technical  change  can be assumed  to be labor- 
augmenting  rather  than neutral,  so that a 1 percent  increase  in the wage 
rate  relative to the productivity trend raises  price  by a2 percent.  Second, the 
price of capital services  can be decomposed  into three components, the 
price  of capital  goods (Pr), the gross  real rate of return  to capital (R,), and 
a tax factor  (Jt):12 
(7)  Nt  =  PtRtt. 
When 7 and the new productivity  assumption  are substituted  into 6, the 
result,  after some algebraic  manipulation,  is 
(8)  =  Mt  )  /"a2Wt  (P  tJt  )  al/a2  Vt  (1-a1-i7a2) 
12. The components of the service price can be further  decomposed into R =  p +  a 
and J =  (1 -  -  r  CA)/(1 -  1. C),  where p is the real rate of interest, a is the deprecia- 
tion rate, v is the rate of investment  tax credit, u is the present value of the depreciation 
deduction,  and  T  C iS the corporate  tax rate. This model of the cost of capital is developed 
in Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson, "Tax Policy and Investment Behavior," 
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The  particular  form  of the rearrangement  in 8 is designed  to clarify  the con- 
ditions under which the elasticity of the gross sales price to a change in 
standard  unit labor  cost (W/Q) will be unity, not the smaller  value a2 as in 
the Nordhaus  version, equation 6. In the long run one would expect an 
increase  in the wage  rate to raise  price  not simply  through  the direct  labor- 
cost elasticity  (the a2 term), but also indirectly  by forcing  up the price of 
capital goods and of materials;  if the costs of these inputs rose propor- 
tionately  with  wage  costs, so would  the overall  price  level. Stated  in another 
way, Nordhaus  implicitly  assumes  that the relative  price of capital goods 
and materials  is reduced  when the wage rate increases;  I assume  that the 
two relative  prices are independent  of changes  in the wage rate.'3 
SHORT-RUN  PRICING 
The attempt to convert the long-run  price equation 8 into a form suit- 
able for estimation  of short-run  price  changes  makes  it clear  that  firms  may 
not base their estimate  of the underlying  "standard"  rate of technological 
change solely on an exponential  trend. Instead, they may consider  devia- 
tions in the actual level of productivity  (Qt) from trend (Q*) partially  as 
temporary  and partially  as calling  for an adjustment  in the "standard"  pro- 
ductivity  level: 
(9)  Qt =  Q*Q  (loi 
where - is a parameter. 
The effect of short-run  changes  of aggregate  demand  can be introduced 
into 8 in two ways. First, it might be assumed  that the level of the scale 
term,  Mt, which  can now be thought  of as the markup  fraction,  depends  on 
the level of excess  demand  (Xe);14  noncompetitive  firms-that is, those with 
some short-run  monopoly power-might raise their markup  margins  to a 
high level during  a boom of a given  intensity  and shift to a lower  level dur- 
ing a recession  in which demand  exhibits  a given degree  of weakness. 
(10)  Mt  Xt, or mt =  fxt, 
where  lower-case  letters  again  represent  rates  of change.  An alternative  ap- 
13. Detailed information  on the labor intensity of capital goods and materials  would 
be required  before a choice could be made between these two possibilities, let alone the 
further possibilities that the two relative prices are increased or change in different 
directions. 
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proach is the assumption that the price adjusts to eliminate excess de- 
mand:"5 
(11)  mt =  yXt. 
In 11, the rate of change of prices relative  to cost depends  on the level of 
excess  commodity  demand,  an assumption  with the appealing  feature  that 
it parallels  the form of the expectational  Phillips  curve for wages in equa- 
tion 1 above. There  is no need to make an a priori  choice between 10 and 
11,  however,  since  they  can be combined,  and  the data  can make  the choice: 
(12)  Mt =  3xt +  7Xt. 
When  9 is substituted  into 8, the result  converted  into an equation  for the 
growth  rate of prices,  and the rate of change  of the markup  allowed  to de- 
pend on both the rate of change  and the level of excess demand  as in 12, 
the result is the "core"l  price equation: 
(13)  pt  =  wt-q*-(I-c)(qt-q* 
+-3xt  +  Xt  +  a(p'-pt  +  rt +  jt) 
+  (1  -xa  -  al2)(vt -pt)  +  ht], 
where  ht is the rate of growth  of 1/(1 -  rI). The price equation  estimated 
in my previous  work on inflation  and price  controls  appeared  in exactly  the 
same form as 13 but restricted  several of the coefficients  to be zero and 
separated  wages from other compensation.'" 
DISAGGREGATION  BY  SECTOR 
Previous  empirical  work on prices  has taken  the form of either  aggregate 
studies,  which  in general  have attempted  to explain  the U.S. Department  of 
Commerce's  deflator  for nonfarm  private  output (DPN), an integral vari- 
able in all large-scale  econometric  models of the U.S. economy, or dis- 
aggregated  studies  of components  of the two basic indexes  compiled  by the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,  the consumer  price index (CPI) and the 
15. Equation 11 has been used previously  in this context in Otto Eckstein and Gary 
Fromm, "The Price Equation," American  Economic  Review, vol. 58 (December 1968), 
pp.  1159-83. 
16. See Robert J. Gordon, "Inflation in Recession and Recovery," BPEA, 1:1971, 
pp. 105-58. The price  equation on p. 129 of that paper  makes the restrictive  assumptions 
thaty  =  rj =it  ht  O,  and thatpk  = Vt =pt. Robert  J. Gordon  621 
wholesale  price  index  (WPI).17  This  paper  attempts  a modest  disaggregation 
within  the framework  of the national  income accounts  (NIA) compiled  by 
the Department  of Commerce.  The aim is to examine  the process  of price 
determination  within  the major  sectors  of the private  economy;  in contrast 
to disaggregated  studies of the CPI and WPI, the predictions  of my sec- 
toral price equations can be averaged  and compared  with predicted  and 
actual  values of the NIA aggregate  private  deflator. 
Although  a wide variety  of annual series  are published,  the scope for dis- 
aggregation  within  the NIA framework  is quite limited for quarterly data. 
Quarterly  deflators  are published  for three breakdowns  of gross national 
product: type of expenditure  (consumption,  investment,  government  ex- 
penditure, and net exports); type  of  product (durables, nondurables, 
services, and structures);  and producing sector (nonfarm business, farm 
business, private nonbusiness,  and government).  The last can hardly be 
classified  as disaggregation,  since the dominant  nonfarm  business  sector  is 
not split up at all. In this paper a disaggregation  by type of product is 
chosen over that by type of expenditure  because  most of the extra  distinc- 
tions between indexes in the expenditure  breakdown  are based on faulty 
data-for  example,  the distinction  between  producers'  and consumers'  du- 
rables,  and between  residential  and nonresidential  structures.'8 
The actual data used in this paper,  then, refer  to four types of product, 
durables, nondurables,  services, and structures-with nondurables  then 
split,  for reasons  described  below, into food and  nonfood  components,  thus 
giving  five sectors for analysis.  Wage payments  to government  employees 
17. Research published through 1970 is reviewed  by Nordhaus in "Recent Develop- 
ments in Price Dynamics." Among the more recent papers on the DPN  are my "'In- 
flation in Recession and Recovery"; George de Menil, "Aggregate Price Dynamics," 
Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 56 (May 1974), pp. 129-40; and Charles L. 
Schultze, "Falling Profits, Rising  Profit Margins, and  the  Full-Employment Profit 
Rate," BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 449-69. Of the recent disaggregated  studies of the CPI and 
WPI, the most comprehensive are Otto Eckstein and David Wyss, "Industry Price 
Equations," in Eckstein, ed., Econometrics  of Price Determination,  and Joel Popkin, 
"Consumer  and Wholesale  Prices in a Model of Price Behavior  by Stage of Processing," 
Review  of Economics  and Statistics, vol. 56 (November 1974), pp. 486-501. 
18. Published indexes show a steady increase  in the relative price of producers'  rela- 
tive to consumers'  durables  that is mainly fictitious due to the omission of the declining 
price of electronic computers and to the greater attention paid to quality changes for 
consumer  durables. In the case of structures,  the residential  and nonresidential  indexes 
make productivity adjustments that  are arbitrary, capricious, and  incomplete. See 
Robert J. Gordon, The Measuremenit  of  Durable Goods Prices (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, forthcoming). 622  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
are  excluded  from  services,  so that the aggregate  and disaggregated  indexes 
refer  to the private  economy only. The official  deflator  for private  product 
is subject  to erratic  quarter-to-quarter  movements  when the mix of output 
shifts between  sectors  with high and low deflators,  particularly  when auto 
production  drops  during  recessions  or strikes.'9  This problem  is minimized 
in this paper  by two procedures.  First, the deflators  for durables  and non- 
durables  refer to final sales, not actual production, and exhibit smaller 
quarter-to-quarter  changes  during  recessions  or strikes.  Second,  the aggre- 
gates of the price-change  variables  are calculated  by a chain-index  proce- 
dure, equivalent to the use of a moving weighted average of the price 
changes  in individual  sectors.20 
THE ENERGY  ADJUSTMENT 
The markup  of final-output  prices  over wage rates  has been strongly  in- 
fluenced  in the 1970s  by the increased  relative  prices  of food and  energy.  An 
attempt is made in this paper to treat the deflator for food prices in a 
fashion  parallel  to deflators  for other  final outputs,  and to identify  the role 
of demand  shifts on the price  of food. But the magnitude  and timing  of the 
1973-74 explosion in energy  prices can only be regarded  as noneconomic 
and exogenous.  The various behavioral  hypotheses  regarding  price deter- 
mination  should  thus be tested  using  price  variables  that have been purged 
of the direct  and indirect  effects of higher  energy  prices. 
In his recent  paper,  Schultze  excluded  from  the nonfarm  private  deflator 
an estimate  of the "relative  increase  in domestic  fossil-fuel  prices  since the 
onset of the embargo  in October  1973."21  Although  this procedure  is ade- 
quate  for an aggregate  price  equation,  it cannot  be used in a disaggregated 
study  because  (1) the weight of energy  input differs  among sectors  of final 
output, and (2) the average  price of energy inputs differs  among sectors 
19. Even in 1975 the deflator for gross auto product used in this paper  was much 
lower than the deflators  for services and structures.  This problem of distortions arising 
from output shifts is much less important, at least temporarily,  in the new deflators for 
the national income accounts, which have been rebased from 1958 to 1972, but which 
were released too late for use in this paper. 
20. Specifically, the weights are an average of the ratios of sectoral final sales to 
aggregate final sales in the current and the three most recent quarters, all in current 
dollars. Each of the various aggregates  in table 2-excluding  food, energy, and both-is 
calculated  with different  weights; in each case the figures  for current-dollar  sales used in 
the weights are the same as the numerators  of the sectoral deflators. 
21. Schultze, "Falling Profits," p. 449. Robert  J. Gordon  623 
because  they  use various  proportions  of coal, gasoline,  fuel oil, natural  gas, 
and electricity.  In this paper  the energy  adjustment  excludes  from current- 
and constant-dollar  final sales in each sector (with oil imports added to 
nonfood nondurable  final sales) the current-  and constant-dollar  values of 
both intermediate  and final  purchases  of energy.  Adding  in oil imports  and 
then subtracting  total energy purchases  means, in effect, that the energy 
adjustment  applies to the domestic  economy only, and includes  the effect 
of increases  in the prices  of domestic  crude  oil, coal, and  natural  gas, as well 
as changes  in the price of value added in the petroleum-refining  and elec- 
tricity-generating  industries.  This procedure  improves the timing of the 
energy  adjustment.  For instance,  a firm  selling  final output  and purchasing 
electricity  as its only form of energy  input  is not affected  immediately  by an 
increase  in crude  oil or coal prices  if the utility supplying  its electricity  en- 
counters  a delay when  it petitions  a regulatory  body to raise  its prices. 
Energy  enters  the price  deflators  for final output  by two routes.  The first 
is the direct  purchase  by consumers  of gasoline,  fuel oil, coal, natural  gas, 
and  electricity.  The energy  coefficients  displayed  in table 1 indicate  that 22.7 
percent  of nonfood nondurable  final sales in 1975:3 consisted  of gasoline, 
motor oil, fuel oil, and other fuel, and 6.2 percent  of sales of services  con- 
sisted of electricity  and natural gas.22  The energy adjustments  for direct 
purchases  are  straightforward  and are  based  on unpublished  quarterly  NIA 
data for direct energy purchases  in 1947-75 in current  and constant  dol- 
lars.23 
Energy  enters  final output  prices  by a second, indirect,  route-as  an in- 
put in the production  of almost all goods and services.  The 1967 input- 
output  table was employed  to allocate energy  input to five sectors  of final 
private  output.24  The first stage in the calculation  was to tally, for each of 
the seventy-eight  two-digit nonenergy  industries  selling final output, the 
value of their  purchases  from three  energy  industries-coal mining,  petro- 
leum refining,  and electricity  generation,25  and then to add in the energy 
22. Consumer purchases  of coal are negligible. 
23. Unpublished quarterly  estimates of current- and constant-dollar purchases are 
subcategories  of personal consumption. These estimates were also the source of  the 
quarterly  deflator for personal consumption of food (which was then adjusted for ex- 
ports and imports). Some interpolation  was necessary in earlier years. See appendix A 
for additional information on the energy and food adjustments. 
24. "The Input-Output Structure of the U.S.  Economy: 1967," Survey of Current 
Business,  vol. 54 (February 1974), pp. 24-56. See especially table 1, pp. 38-43. 
25. A fourth energy  industry,  crude oil, sells almost all of its output to the petroleum 
refining  industry. 624  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1975 
Table 1. Share  of Direct and  Indirect  Energy  Input  in Gross  Private 
Final Sales, by Sector,  Third  Quarter  1975 
Value  of  Total  Share of 
energy  iniput  final sales  energy input 
(billions  of  (billions  of  in total sales 
Sector and use of input  dollars)  dollars)  (percent) 
Total economy  160.78  1,330.8  12.1 
Durables (indirect)  16.2  269.0  6.0 
Nondurables 
Food (indirect)  12.3  218.6b  5.6 
Nonfood  71.88  242.7  29.6 
Indirect  16.7  ...  6.9 
Direct (gasoline, motor oil,  55.18  ...  22.7 
fuel oil, and other fuel) 
Services  53.4  470.9  11.3 
Indirect  24.1  ...  5.1 
Direct (electricity  and  29.3  ...  6.2 
natural gas) 
Structures  (indirect)  7.0  129.6  5.4 
Source:  See appendix A. 
a.  Does  not exclude oil imports and thus differs from appendix table A-1. 
b.  Consumer expenditures on food  plus food  exports minus food  imports. 
purchases  of each of their nonenergy  supplying  industries.  Further  addi- 
tions were  made for the purchases  of the suppliers  from their  suppliers,  and 
so on until total intermediate  purchases  of energy  were accounted  for. 
Table 1 displays  the results  of the calculation  of 1967  indirect  energy  in- 
put, restated  in 1975:3 prices of both energy  input and final output. It is 
perhaps  surprising  that the indirect  energy  shares  are so similar  for the four 
types of products.  The major  differences  appear  to lie in the proportions  of 
fuel and electricity;  consumer  nontransportation  services  are relatively  in- 
tensive  in electricity,  whereas  relatively  little electricity  is used in producing 
structures. 
A quarterly  constant-dollar  series  for indirect  energy  use was constructed 
for 1947-75 for each of the five sectors on the assumption  that the input- 
output coefficients  remained  fixed in real terms  at 1967 levels. An energy 
price index was then used to create a parallel current-dollar  series for 
indirect  energy  use. The direct and indirect  measures  of quarterly  energy 
input in both current  and constant  dollars  were  then subtracted  from final 
sales in each sector to yield five sectoral deflators  for private final sales 
net of energy. Robert  J. Gordon  625 
Behavior  of the Private  Deflators  Adjusted  for Food and Energy 
Several  interesting  features  of price behavior  are illustrated  in table 2, 
which  displays  for a number  of price  deflators  the total of the fifteen  quar- 
terly  percentage  changes  between 1971:4 and 1975:3, and the annual  rate 
of change  in selected  subperiods.  The energy  adjustment  reduces  the 27 per- 
cent  price  increase  for the private  economy  between  1971:4 and 1975:3 by 
about 21/2 percentage  points, and the exclusion of food cuts out another 
2.4 percentage  points. Thus, the nonfood deflator  net of energy  increased 
for the period at an annual  rate of 6.0 percent,  as compared  with the 4.8 
percent  rate of increase  in the nonfood deflator  in the six quarters  prior  to 
the imposition  of price controls  in 1971. 
The effects  of excluding  food and energy  from  the aggregate  chain  index 
are quite different  in timing. The relative increase  in the index of food 
prices  occurred  mainly  in 1973  (line 4a), whereas  the energy  explosion  was 
concentrated  in the first  half of 1974  (line 8a). Fifty-two  percent  of the effect 
of the energy  adjustment  (line 2b compared  with 2a) occurred  in the first 
half of 1974, 12  percent  in 1972  and 1973,  and the remainder  since 1974:2. 
Table  2 also reveals  variations  in the timing  and  magnitude  of the increases 
in energy prices among the various sectors. The net price of energy in- 
creased  much  less in the nonfood nondurables  sector  than in other sectors, 
because  imports  of petroleum  products  are subtracted  from direct  and in- 
direct  purchases  of energy  in that sector. In the last half of 1973 the net 
energy deflator  for the nonfood nondurables  sector actually  declined,  re- 
flecting  the role of this sector  as a conduit  for imports.  In a simple  extreme 
case in which  the nonfood nondurables  sector  imported  refined  oil and sold 
all of it to other sectors,  reserving  none for its own indirect  or direct  use, 
the net energy deflator  in that sector would decline pari passu with any 
increase  in the price  of petroleum  imports,  reflecting  the effect  of energy  in 
reducing  the measured  sectoral  deflator  for final sales.26 
Another feature  of table 2 is the somewhat  greater  effect of excluding 
26. Putting the point another way, between early 1974 and mid-1975 the published 
deflator for nondurables increased substantially less than the deflator for  domestic 
nondurables  consumption because of the effect of the quadrupling  of oil-import prices. 
Nondurable net exports during this period were strongly positive in  1958 constant 
dollars, and strongly negative in current dollars. (These remarks are based on an un- 
published  series on nondurable  exports and imports  kindly supplied  by John A. Gorman 
of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.) in  0  I'l  C  tn  V-- tn  en  ^  W 
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food from  the aggregate  final-sales  chain  index  (line 2c compared  with line 
2a) than of excluding  the farm sector from private  product  (line lb com- 
pared  with line la). Since net farm exports are included  in both the food 
and the farm  deflators,  most of the remaining  difference  between  the two is 
accounted  for by the inclusion  in the former  of the gross product of the 
farm-to-market  food-processing  industries  and of the cost of inputs pur- 
chased  by farmers.  Over  the period  covered  in table 2, the implicit  deflator 
for food minus  gross  farm  product  increased  50 percent  faster  than that for 
the private  sector as a whole.27 
I believe  that  the unusual  increase  in relative  prices  in this sector  is a puz- 
zle that will require  a separate  study  to untangle.  For this reason,  the index 
of change  in aggregate  prices  used in the econometric  equations  in this pa- 
per excludes  from private  final sales the value of food sales (that is, food 
consumption  plus exports  minus imports)  both (1) to avoid attributing  to 
the entire  economy,  as does Schultze,  puzzling  behavior  that can be traced 
to one sector,  and  (2) because  the farm  deflator  used  in calculating  the usual 
nonfarm private deflator  may be unreliable.28  A preliminary  attempt to 
track  down developments  in the food-minus-farm  sector  suggests  that labor 
productivity  may have been part of the problem.  Between 1971 and 1974 
output  per  manhour  in the industries  that  market  food products  actuallyfell 
by 4 percent.  Unit labor cost rose over the same  period  by 32.8 percent,  as 
compared  with an increase  of only 20.3 percent  in the entire  private  econ- 
omy.29 
In "Falling  Profits,"  Schultze  attempted  to explain  the increase  between 
1973:  1 and 1975:  2 in the ratio of price  to trend  unit labor  cost in the non- 
farm sector. In contrast  with the 6.0 percent  increase  over that period in 
Schultze's  ratio using an energy-adjusted  nonfarm  price  index  and a trend- 
adjusted  wage series, another ratio using my energy- and food-adjusted 
chain index and Schultze's  labor-cost variable increased  exactly half as 
27. Taking the simple difference  between the implicit deflators  in 1975:  3 and 1971:  4, 
and dividing by the value of the deflator in  1971:4, yields the following percentage 
changes for the various deflators: private product, 30.7; food, 48.3; farm, 57.8; and 
food minus farm, 45.5. 
28. The second possibility was suggested to me by Barry Bosworth. 
29. Unit labor cost, output, and manhours for industries  that market food products 
are from U.S. Department of Agriculture,  Economic Research Service, Marketing  and 
Transportation  Situation, MTS-198 (August 1975), table 11, p. 24. Total private unit 
labor cost is from Monthily  Labor Review, vol. 98 (December 1975), table 31, p. 109. Robert  J. Gordon  629 
much, 3.0 percent.  The difference  between Schultze's  and my adjusted  in- 
dexes breaks  down as follows: 
Percentage 
Component  of difference  points 
1973:1-1975:2  increase in  my  chain-weighted nonfood  net-of. 
energy  index for private  final sales  18.43 
Contribution of increased relative price of  the food-minus-farm 
sector  1.93 
Contribution  of excess of my energy deduction over Schultze's  en- 
ergy deduction  0.77 
Contribution  of my use of the final-sales  concept (that is, exclusion 
of manufacturing  inventory accumulation)  0.27 
Effect of chain-weighted  index in place of implicit deflator  -0.05 
Unexplained  residual  0.51 
Total 1973:1-1975:2 increase  in Schultze  index for nonfarm  sec- 
tor net of energy  21.86 
DATA  FOR  THE  CORE PRICE  EQUATION 
In addition  to data on the price level, the core price equation 13 devel- 
oped above requires  data for several  explanatory  variables. 
Commodity  excess demand  (Xt).  A traditional problem in empirical stud- 
ies of price behavior  is the absence of adequate  measures  of the demand 
for commodities.  Measured  sales may differ  from demand  if supply con- 
straints  prevent  the instantaneous  filling  of orders.  This paper  follows pre- 
vious studies  in its use of the ratio of unfilled  orders  to capacity  as a proxy 
for Xt in the total economy  and in durables  manufacturing,  because  this is 
the only available  variable  that measures  demand  rather  than supply.80  Be- 
cause  the coverage  of this variable  is limited  to durables  manufacturing,  the 
percentage  gap between  actual  and potential  output  is also used  below as a 
potential proxy. Other proxies are used in several of the disaggregated 
sectoral  equations. 
The wage rate (Wt). Two alternative  comprehensive  wage indexes are 
available,  private  nonfarm  compensation  per  manhour  (CMH) and average 
30. This variable was used in my "Inflation in Recession and Recovery" and by 
de Menil. It is calculated by multiplying  the ratio of unfilled orders  to shipments  (series 
852 in Business  Conditions  Digest) by the rate of capacity utilization in manufacturing 
(series 850), and then detrending. 630  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
private  nonfarm  hourly  earnings  adjusted  to exclude  the effects  of overtime 
pay and shifts in interindustry  output (AHEA). The former  is more com- 
prehensive  than the latter but suffers  from its sensitivity  to cyclical shifts 
in output.  I use the ratio of adjusted  to unadjusted  average  private  hourly 
earnings  (AHEA/AHE) to adjust  the CMH series  for these cyclical  shifts. 
This  procedure  differs  from  my earlier  price  equations,  in which  the rates  of 
change  of AHEA and CMH/AHEA were  introduced  as two separate  vari- 
ables.3' 
Trend  productivity  (Q*t). This paper  follows Schultze  by allowing  a break 
in the trend growth rate of productivity,  with an estimated  annual trend 
growth  rate  (qt) of 2.81 percent  for 1954-63  and 2.28 percent  for 1964-74.32 
To prevent  a discontinuity,  the shift in the productivity  trend  was allowed 
to occur over a period of five years centered  in 1964:1. 
The  price of capital services (PRtJJ/Pt).  The real price of capital services 
consists of three  terms,  the relative  price of investment  goods (PK/P,),  the 
gross rate of return  on capital  (Rt), and a tax term  (Jr). The relative-price 
data were obtained  from the national income accounts.  The gross rate of 
return  on capital was defined  as the commercial  paper rate plus the con- 
stant  depreciation  rate  used in B. G. Hickman  and R. M. Coen, An Annual 
Growth Model of the U.S. Economy (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1976), 
chapter  5, section  4. The tax term,  exactly  as defined  in note 12 above, was 
obtained from the data bank of the Hickman-Coen  model, furnished  by 
my colleague  Robert M. Coen. 
The relative price of materials (Vt/P,).  The spot-market price index for 
thirteen  raw industrials  is used in the equations  for the aggregate  economy 
and for manufacturing.  The WPI index for crude  foodstuffs  and feedstuffs 
products  is used as an explanatory  variable  in the equations  for the food 
deflator.  The WPI index for nonfood materials  and components  for con- 
struction  is used as an explanatory  variable  in the construction  equation. 
31. See "Inflation in Recession and Recovery," pp. 115-18. 
32. An equation was estimated having the general form 
7 
qt=  aoAo +  a1Aj +  E  big,_i, 
i0O 
where gt  is the quarterly  difference in the ratio of the GNP gap to potential output, 
Ao =  1.0 for  1953:1-1963:4  and 0 thereafter, and A1 =  1.0  for 1964:1-1975:2  and 
0 previously.  The resulting estimates of the trend were ao =  0.00708 and a, =  0.00570. 
A similar  equation was estimated for manufacturing  and indicates a slight acceleration 
in trend productivity growth, from ao =  0.00731 to a, =  0.00854,  -with the equation 
split at 1968:4. Robert  J. Gordon  631 
The indirect  tax rate (X1).  The effective  indirect  tax rate is measured  as 
the ratio of the NIA series on indirect  tax liability  to total personal  con- 
sumption  expenditures. 
Empirical  Results  for the Private  Nonfood  Deflator 
COMMON FEATURES  OF THE EQUATIONS 
The basic results  in the tables below are reported  for a single common 
sample  period, 1954:2  to 1971:2. The starting  date, shared  with  my earlier 
papers  for BPEA, was chosen to avoid the period of price  controls  during 
the Korean War and an outlying observation  in the first quarter  of 1954. 
The ending  date  is the final  quarter  before  the imposition  of wage  and  price 
controls  in August 1971.  While the price equations  for disaggregated  final 
output are estimated  below only for the single common sample period, 
equations  explaining  the aggregate  private  nonfood deflator  are estimated 
also for the two halves of the common sample period, and for a longer 
period that includes  the Korean War. 
The dependent  price variable in all equations is in the form of a one- 
quarter  rate of change  (at a quarterly  rate). All independent  variables  are 
also measured  as one-quarter  rates of change, with the exception of the 
level of aggregate  demand  (Xe). Although some studies  by other authors 
have constrained  all independent  variables  in the price equation to influ- 
ence the dependent  variable with the same distributed  lag, through the 
technique  of including  the lagged  dependent  variable  on the right-hand  side 
of the estimated  equations,  experimentation  suggests  that the lag patterns 
of the various independent  variables  are actually  quite different. 
The Almon technique  allows the estimation  of different  polynomial  dis- 
tributed  lags for several independent  variables.  Its major disadvantage  is 
that several  initial trial runs are required  to determine  whether  any inde- 
pendent  variables  exhibit  lagged  effects  and, if so, for how long. In all trial 
runs the individual  lag coefficients  were assumed  to lie on a third-degree 
polynomial  and no end-point  constraints  were  imposed.  Variables  with  low 
I-ratios  on the individual  lag coefficients  in the basic core equation  for the 
common  sample  period  were  thereafter  entered  without  lags. When t-ratios 
on the  final  (tail)  lag coefficients  were  relatively  large,  on the other  hand,  the 
lag distribution  was lengthened.  Since this search procedure  was not re- 632  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
peated for the disaggregated  equations  nor for the tests of the aggregate 
equation over the subsample  periods, the length of the lag distributions 
may be too short or too long in some of these cases. 
THE EFFECT OF AGGREGATE  DEMAND 
In table 3, which  presents  the basic  results,  the left panel displays  the co- 
efficients  of several  common "nondemand"  variables,  and the right panel 
compares  the coefficients  of alternative  variables  that serve as proxies for 
the effect  on prices  of aggregate  demand.  Each of the nondemand  variables 
in columns (2) through (6) is the quarterly  rate of change of a ratio, as 
follows: 
Column 2 is compensation  per manhour  in the private  economy, mul- 
tiplied  by the ratio of the adjusted  to the unadjusted  index  for private  non- 
farm  hourly  earnings,  and then  divided  by an estimate  of trend  productivity 
(w-q*). 
Column  3 is the ratio of actual to "trend"  productivity  (q -q*). 
Column 4 is the ratio of the investment-goods  deflator  to the private- 
product  deflator  '  -  p). The capital-tax  and capital-cost  variables  were 
dropped  after preliminary  trials  (see the discussion  for table 6 below). 
Column 5 is the ratio in the form [1/(1 -  r)], where r is the effective 
indirect  business-tax  rate (h). 
Column  6 is the ratio of the spot-market-price  index of thirteen  raw in- 
dustrials to the private nonfood  index (v -  p). 
The right  panel of the table contains  columns  for the level and quarterly 
rate of change of two demand proxies, the gap between real GNP and 
potential  output  (GAP),  and the detrended  ratio of unfilled  orders  to capac- 
ity in durables  manufacturing  (UFK). Columns 11 and 12, labeled UFKI 
and UFK2, illustrate  coefficients  on the rate of change  of UFK split into one 
variable  (UFK1) for the first  half of the sample  period and another  (UFK2) 
for the second  half. All variables  are expected  a priori  to have positive  co- 
efficients,  with the exception of materials  prices (v -  p), the productivity 
deviation  (q -  q*), and GAP. Since the dependent  variable is aggregate 
value added,  the coefficient  on materials  prices should be zero and will be 
positive  only if the timing  of price  increases  is influenced  by changes  in ma- 
terials  prices.  The coefficients  on (q -  q*) and GAP  should  be negative. 
Equation  3.1 is the complete  core  equation  without  any demand  variable. 
As is true  in most of the equations  for the common sample  period,  the co- Robert  J. Gordon  633 
efficient  on the productivity  deviation  (q -  q*) has a low significance  level. 
All other  variables  enter  with the expected  signs. The size of the other co- 
efficients  should be judged in comparison  with the theoretical  equation 13 
above, in which the coefficient on (w -  q*) should be unity, that on 
p  -  p)  should  be al/a2,  and that on h should  be l/a2,  where  a, is the share 
of capital and a2 the share of labor. If, for instance,  a,  =  0.25 and a2  = 
0.75, then  the coefficient  on (pk -p)  should  be 0.33 and  that on h should  be 
1.33.  Most of the coefficients  on (p' -  p) in table 3 are of roughly  the right 
size, but all of the coefficients  on h are much too small, perhaps  indicating 
a measurement  error  in the series on effective  indirect  taxes. 
In equations  3.2-3.5, various  demand-proxy  variables  are added, one at 
a time. The distributed-lag  patterns on the level variables  (equations 3.2 
and 3.3) are first negative and then positive for GAP, and the reverse  for 
UFK, indicating  that these  variables  basically  enter  in rate-of-change  form, 
and explaining  why the t-ratios  on the sums of coefficients  (equation 3.2, 
column  7, and equation  3.3, column 8) are so small in spite of the very sig- 
nificant  reduction  in the standard  error  achieved  in comparison  with 3.1. 
The rate-of-change  variables,  both GAP  and UFK, also enter  strongly,  sug- 
gesting  that aggregate  demand  does have a strong  effect on price  markups 
in the United States,  in contrast  with the Nordhaus-Godley  rejection  of "a 
systematic  or significant"  aggregate-demand  effect in U.K. data.33  The re- 
sults also appear to counter the general impression  held by many U.S. 
economists  that the demand  effect  on the price  markup  is weak-for  exam- 
ple, Cagan's  remark  that "empirical  studies  have long found  that short-run 
shifts in demand  have small and often insignificant  effects [on prices]  and 
that, instead, costs play a dominant role.34  The results in table 3 by no 
means deny a very strong  role for costs, mainly standard  unit labor costs, 
but do allow for a demand  effect  that makes a significant  difference  in the 
rate of inflation between boom years and recession years, holding costs 
constant (see figure  2 discussed  later in this section). 
There  is little to choose among  equations  3.2 through  3.5; nevertheless,  a 
single demand  variable  must be chosen for further  exploration  in this and 
other tables of the paper. The level variables  (equations  3.2 and 3.3) are 
rejected  for the expositional  reason  that their zigzag  pattern  of coefficients 
makes  the demand  effect  difficult  to display  compactly.  The choice  between 
33. "Pricing  in the Trade Cycle," p. 873. 
34. Phillip  Cagan, The Hydra-Headed Monster: The Problem of  Inflation in  the 
United  States (American Enterprise  Institute, 1974), p. 22. ;^  U  >  I  *  <  ^  ?  e--4  ?  r 
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the rates  of change  of GAP  and UFK was made in favor of the latter  on the 
ground  that its overall  fit is better,  although  a case could also be made for 
the former  on the basis that the t-ratios  on the nondemand  variables  are 
higher  in equation 3.4 than in equation  3.5.35 
Equation  3.6 is identical  to 3.5 with the insignificant  productivity-devia- 
tion variable  removed  and is henceforth  taken to be the basic estimate  of 
the core price equation. The individual  distributed-lag  coefficients  in this 
equation are displayed in table 4; the shape of the lag distribution  on 
standard  unit labor cost is humpbacked,  that on the relative  price of in- 
vestment  goods declines  in two steps (in quarters  0-1 and 6-7), while that 
on the UFK demand  variable  declines  monotonically.  The respective  mean 
lags on the three variables  are 4.14, 2.94, and 1.10 quarters. 
Equation 3.7 is the same as equation  3.6 but splits the rate of change  of 
UFK into two separate  variables  for the two halves of the sample  period.36 
The coefficients  on the rate of change of UFK are almost identical  in the 
two subsample  periods.  Another  test of structural  shift is reported  in equa- 
tions 3.8-3.11. The core equation  as specified  in equation  3.5 was run sepa- 
rately for the two halves of the sample  period, both with and without the 
rate of change  of UFK. Two important  points stand out in these compari- 
sons. First, the demand  variable  is only marginally  significant  in the first 
subsample  period but is very significant  in the second period. Second, a 
formal Chow test yields F-ratios of 1.71 for the equations  without a de- 
mand variable  (that is, equation 3.1 compared  with 3.8 and 3.10) and of 
only 0.68 for the fuli equations  (3.5 compared  with 3.9 and 3.11). However, 
the term for the relative  price of capital goods has the wrong sign in the 
second  period  when  the demand  variable  is omitted.  Thus,  with  the demand 
variables  in the equation,  the hypothesis  that the structure  was identical  in 
the two periods cannot be rejected.37 
In short,  there  is no evidence  that the effect  of demand  on prices  has be- 
come less important  in the second half of the sample  period as compared 
35. Two other considerations favoring the change in  UFK are that it was used in 
my 1971 "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery," and thus preserves  some continuity of 
specification, and that the level and rate of change of  UFK were emphasized in the 
version of this paper presented at the panel meeting. 
36. The distributed-lag  coefficients are not  estimated freely, but instead are con- 
strained to follow the linear pattern specified  in note h of table 3. 
37. The critical F-values are 1.87 at the 5 percent level and 2.40 at the 1 percent 
level. Robert  J. Gordon  637 
Table  4. Estimates  of Lag Coefficients  in the Core  Price Equationa 
Trend  unit  Relative  price  Ratio of u{fllled 
labor cost  of investmenzt  goods  orders  to capacity 
Lag  (w -  q*)  (pk  -p)  UlFK 
0  0.0461  0.0804  0.0258 
(0.77)  (1.24)  (3.84) 
0.1095  0.0604  0.0188 
(2.77)  (1.51)  (5.11) 
2  ()0.1474  0.0513  0.0127 
(4.41)  (1.25)  (3.11) 
3  0.1636  0.0491  0.0077 
(5.30)  (1.39)  (1.96) 
4  0.1623  0.0497  0.0037 
(6.05)  (1.71)  (0.96) 
5  0.1474  0.0491  0.0009 
(6.64)  (1.42)  (0.18) 
6  0. 1229  0.0433  -0.0007 
(5.71)  (1.04)  (-0.13) 
7  0.0929  0.0282  -0.0010 
(3.49)  (0.83)  (-0.25) 
8  0.0614  ...  ... 
(1.84) 
9  0.0323  ...  ... 
(0.87) 
10  0.0097 
(0.28) 
11  -0.0024 
(-0.10) 
Sum  1.0929  0.4114  0.0676 
(19.97)  (3.49)  (2.89) 
Mean lag (quarters)  4. 1  2.9  1  . 1 
Sources: Derived from table 3, equation 3.6, the core equation. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
with the first, a conclusion  that conflicts  with Cagan's  research.38  Further, 
tlle structure  of the price equation remains  quite stable over the 1954-71 
period when the demand variable is allowed to enter. The major differ- 
ences appear  to be an increase  in the coefficients  on trend unit labor cost 
and on the demand  variable  from  the first  subsample  period  to the second, 
together  with a decrease  in the coefficients  on the relative  price of invest- 
ment goods and of materials. 
38. Cagan, "Changes in the Recession Behavior of  Wholesale Prices." Since this 
paper holds wage behavior constant, while Cagan's does not, the conflicting results 
may be reconciled if the response of wages to recessions has become weaker, but that 
of prices given wvages  has not. 638  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
A final  pair of equations,  3.12 and 3.13, is presented,  including  all of the 
variables  in equations  3.1 and 3.5, respectively,  but extending  the sample 
period back to include  the Korean War period. To allow for the effect of 
price  controls  during 1951-53,  a dummy  variable  is added  to the specifica- 
tion for both equations  3.12 and 3.13 (for details  and coefficients,  see note i 
to table 3). The longer sample period confirms  the basic conclusion that 
aggregate  demand,  in the form of the UFK variable,  adds significantly  to 
the explanation  of postwar  price behavior.  Another feature  of the longer 
sample  period  is that the relative  price  of materials  has larger  and  more sig- 
nificant  coefficients.  As is true in all the sample  periods,  the coefficient  on 
the relative  price  of materials  drops  substantially  when  the demand  variable 
is introduced,  as would be expected  if the two are positively  correlated. 
INTERPRETATIONS  OF THE SAMPLE  AND  POST-SAMPLE  PERIODS 
The actual quarterly  rate of change of the chain price index developed 
here  (private  nonfood final sales net of energy  prices)  is compared  in figure 
I with the sample-period  and post-sample  predictions  of the basic core 
equation 3.6. All major movements of the actual series are tracked  well; 
moreover,  so are several  minor movements-for  example, the temporary 
drop in the inflation rate in mid-1965 associated with the reduction in 
federal  excise-tax  rates.  The major  errors  are a slight  tendency  to underpre- 
dict during 1955-56  and 1964  and to overpredict  during 1959. 
In this paper  the 1971-75  period  is evaluated  by means  of simulations  of 
the post-sample  period rather  than by extension of the termination  point 
of the estimated  equations  to 1975.  A crucial  feature  of price  behavior  dur- 
ing 1971-75  was the imposition  of price controls  during 1971-73 followed 
by their complete  removal in 1974. Estimation  of price equations  for the 
1971-75 period  that include  a single dummy  variable  measuring  the effect 
of the controls imposes the a priori constraint  that the effect of controls 
operates  solely via a shift in the constant  term.  As Oi has argued,  the con- 
trols could equally  well have shifted  coefficients  on variables  other  than the 
constant.39  Although  it is possible  in principle  to estimate  a price equation 
for the 1971-75  period that includes  k separate  dummy  variables,  one for 
each of k independent  variables,  this procedure  would more than exhaust 
the available  degrees  of freedom. 
39. See Walter Y. Oi, "On Measuring  the Impact of Controls," Journal  of Monetary 
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The implication  of the extrapolation  into the post-sample  period  is dra- 
matic and surprising.  The price  explosion of 1974  can be explained  almost 
entirely  as a post-controls  rebound.  The actual  rate of inflation  was below 
the value  predicted  by the equation  throughout  the 1971:3-1973:3 period, 
and was above the predicted  values  in the 1973:4-1975:3  period  by almost 
exactly  the same amount.  The values of the errors  are listed in more detail 
in table 5, column 2. On average,  the equation was almost perfectly on 
target  during  the last four years of the sample period (lines la and lb in 
table 5). Then the actual  rate of inflation  fell well below the predicted  rate 
(given, of course,  the actual  behavior  of wages)  by 2.0 percent  at an annual 
rate during  Phases  I and II of price  controls.  The total shortfall  of the level 
of the deflator  below  its predicted  value  reached  a maximum  of 3.48  percent 
in 1973:3 (line 2a).40 
The excess of the actual over the predicted  rate of change  was 4.56 per- 
cent during the six quarters  between 1973:4 and 1975:1, followed by a 
further 1.04 percent shortfall during the final two quarters,  1975:2 and 
1975:3. A clue to the source of the overprediction  during the final two 
quarters  is provided by figure 2, which decomposes the predicted  price 
series  (as illustrated  in figure 1) into the contributions  of the five indepen- 
dent variables.  The rate of growth  of trend  unit labor cost is the only ex- 
planatory  variable  that pushes  the predicted  price series  upward  in 1975:2 
and 1975:  3, as compared  with its contribution  in the previous year. The 
rate of growth  of adjusted  compensation  per manhour  minus the produc- 
tivity  trend  more  than  doubled  from  a 4.02 percent  rate  in the four quarters 
ending in  1974:  1 to an 8.24 percent rate in the four quarters  ending in 
1975:  1, and  this wage  acceleration  feeds  slowly  through  the lag distribution 
displayed  in table 4. If the estimated  core equation overstates  the lag in 
adjustment  of prices to wage change, then the underprediction  of price 
change in 1974 and the overprediction  in 1975:2 and 1975:3 are corre- 
spondingly  overstated.  (In 1975:2 and 1975:3 the value of (w -  q*) decel- 
erated  to a 7.04 percent  annual  rate.) 
Columns  3 and 4 of table 5 display  the over- and underpredictions  for 
the post-sample  period of two other  equations  with sample  periods  ending 
in 1971  :2. The equation  estimated  for the period 1963:1-1971:2 underpre- 
dicts 1974 and overpredicts  mid-1975  to an even greater  extent than does 
40. This is slightly larger than the maximum shortfall of  2.7 percent estimated by 
the same technique with a different  specification  of the price equation in my "Response 
of Wages and Prices," table 1, column 15, value for 1973:3. Robert  J. Gordon  641 
Table 5. Actual  Values  and  Prediction  Errors  for Rates of Change  of 
Chain  Index for Private  Nonfood  Final Sales Net of Energy, 
Three  Equations,  Various  Periods,  1967-75 
Percentage  points 
Errors (actual minus  predicted) 
Equation  Equation  Equation 
3.6  3.11  3.13 
(1954:2-  (1963:1-  (1950:2- 
1971  :2)a  1971  :2)a  1971:2)a 
Type  of change  Actual 
and  period  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1.  Average  annual  rate of chanige 
a.  1967:2-1969:2  4.33  0.01  -0.04  0.30 
b.  1969:2-1971:2  5.52  0.06  0.07  -0.04 
c.  1971:2-1975:3  5.46  0.01  -0.10  -0.08 
2.  Total changeb 
a.  1971:2-1973:3  7.79  -3.48  -3.66  -5.12 
b.  1973:3-1975:1  13.28  4.56  5.21  5.57 
c.  1975:1-1975:3  2.12  -1.04  -1.93  -0.76 
d.  Total, 
1971:2-1975:3  23.19  0.04  -0.38  -0.31 
Source:  Derived from table 3, equations 3.6, 3.11, 3.13. 
a.  Sample period. 
b.  Sum of quarterly rates of change. 
the core equation,  mainly because  the lag of prices  behind  wage change  is 
even longer  (a mean  lag of 5.21 quarters  as compared  with 4.14). The story 
is similar  for the equation  fitted  to the long period 1950:2-1971:2 (a mean 
wage  lag of 5.07 quarters),  but in addition  there  is a greater  overprediction 
during  1971:2-1973:3  and a smaller  overprediction  during  1975:1-1975:3, 
caused  by the higher  coefficient  on the relative  price of materials,  the value 
of which was rising  during 1973  and falling during 1975. 
Overall,  none of the estimated  equations  is able to capture  the decelera- 
tion of price  change  in mid-1975.  This failure  does not necessarily  discredit 
the equations  as a description  of normal  relationships,  but rather  may offer 
an example  of Lucas'  point that structural  parameters  may be functions  of 
the policy environment.41 Because  both firms and workers  were aware  in 
advance  that controls were to be lifted at the end of April 1974,  the lags 
from wages  to prices  and vice versa  may have operated  with unusual  speed 
41. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique,"  Journal  of 
Monetary  Economics,  vol. 2 (January  1976 supplement). .~~~~~~~~~~t.  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  C 
It)~~~~~~~~~~t 
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during the post-controls  rebound. The equations estimated  to earlier in- 
tervals  may be more accurate  when used for forecasting  in future  periods 
when controls are not relevant. 
Another  interesting  feature  of figure  2 is the estimated  contribution  of the 
aggregate-demand  proxy to price change during  the postwar  period. The 
following table shows the differences  in the inflation  rate associated  with 
movements  of the demand  variable  between its minimum  and maximum 
values  in individual  postwar  half-cycles;  the estimates  are based on the co- 
efficients  from table 3, equation  3.6, as illustrated  in figure  2. 
Difference  in annual 
Half-cycle  rate of inflation 
Trough 1954:1 to peak 1956:3  4.33 
Peak 1956:3 to trough 1958:1  -4.46 
Trough 1958:1 to peak 1959:4  3.12 
Peak 1959:4 to trough 1960:4  -1.68 
Trough 1960:4 to peak 1966:3  1.99 
Peak 1966:3 to trough 1970:4  -2.36 
Trough 1970:4 to peak 1973:3  2.36 
Peak 1973:3 to trough 1975:2  -2.16 
Average  absolute value, 1954:1-1975:2  2.81 
These  positive  and negative  demand  effects  roughly  cancel  out over  a whole 
cycle. But demand  plays a very significant  role in the rate of inflation  ob- 
served at peaks and troughs, over and above any effect of demand on 
wages. The demand effect estimated in this paper is considerably  larger 
than any estimated  in previous  papers  by myself or other authors,  mainly 
because  (1) here the demand  variable  is allowed  to enter  with a distributed 
lag and is not constrained  to have its entire  effect instantaneously,  and (2) 
the wage variable  is adjusted  in this paper for the effects of overtime  and 
interindustry  shifts in output; that is, cyclical  effects  that in some previous 
papers  were picked up by the unadjusted  wage variable  are here properly 
attributed  to the demand  variable. 
THE PRICE  OF CAPITAL  SERVICES 
According to the basic theoretical equation 13, the rate of change of 
prices  should  depend  not only on the rates  of change  of standard  unit labor 
cost and of the relative  price of materials,  but also on that of the relative 
price of capital services.  Of the three components  of the relative  price of 644  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
capital  services-the relative  price of investment  goods, the cost of capital, 
and the tax term-only  the first has been used in the equations  estimated 
thus far in the paper. This is a consequence  of the poor statistical  perfor- 
mance of the other two components,  as illustrated  in table 6. In equation 
6.2, the total relative  price  of capital  services  (n) enters  with an insignificant 
coefficient,  as does the cost of capital  (r) by itself in equation  6.4. In equa- 
tion 6.5 the tax term  (j) enters  very significantly,  but with the wrong sign. 
Lower  effective  taxes on capital,  reflected  in the corporate-tax  rate, the in- 
vestment  tax credit, and liberalization  of depreciation  provisions,  did not 
reduce  the aggregate  price level relative  to wages in 1954-55, 1962-64, or 
1971,  nor was the price  level raised  as a result  of the temporary  increase  in 
the effective  tax on capital  in 1968-69. 
If the cost-of-capital  and tax terms  are insignificant  or of the wrong sign, 
how can one explain  the strong  effect  of the relative  price  of capital  goods? 
One hypothesis  is that the relative-price  term,  like the relative  price of raw 
materials,  may be acting at least partly as a further  proxy for demand,  in 
this case the demand  for investment  goods. By this interpretation  the mark- 
up of price over standard  unit labor cost was widened  during  the 1955-57 
period as a consequence  of the unusually  intense demand for investment 
goods.42  The UFK  variable  may be only an imperfect  proxy for the inten- 
sity of the 1955-57  boom in investment  goods, requiring  the "help"  of rela- 
tive investment  prices for a full explanation  of price behavior. 
42. Assume that the aggregate  rate of inflation (p) consists of inflation in investment 
goods (pl) and noninvestment  goods (pN): 
(a)  p  =  gpI  (1g)PN. 
Assume also that the rate of inflation in noninvestment  goods is completely determined 
by the rate of change of wages (w), but that the rate of inflation in investment goods 
depends as well on the rate of change of demand (x), which is assumed to be unobserv- 
able: 
(b)  p=  w, 
(c)  pI  =W  +  X. 
Combining (a), (b), and (c) yields 
(d)  p =w  +  gx. 
Estimating  an aggregate price equation in which the relative price of investment goods 
is included as a separate variable, 
(e)  p  =  h(p'-p)  + w, 
effectively  introduces  a proxy for the demand  term,  x, which  is assumed  to be unobservable. 
Substituting  (c) and (d) into (e) yields 
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RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  AND  THE EFFECT OF 
CHANGES  IN  THE MONEY  SUPPLY 
As a possible  alternative  to a specification  such as the core  model of price 
determination  developed  here,  several  authors  have used the assumption  of 
instantaneous  response  of price  changes  to changes  in the money supply  in 
their application  of the theory of rational expectations  to economic pol- 
icy.43 Although economists  who have attempted  to explain U.S. prices in 
large-  or small-scale  econometric  models have been skeptical  of any direct 
association  between  monetary  changes  and  inflation,  and  in fact have  rarely 
tested  for such an association,  there  is no reason  why the "Almon-lag  trial 
run" technique  cannot be used to search  for a direct  monetary  effect. 
After considerable  experimentation,  a very strong reduced-form  rela- 
tionship between  money and prices  has been uncovered;  it is displayed  in 
equation 7.1 of table 7 for the common sample period (1954:2-1971:2). 
The rate of change of money by itself, with no help from wage, produc- 
tivity, or tax data, can explain changes  in the nonfood deflator  almost as 
well as the structural  specification  (equation 3.4) that uses the rate of 
change of the GNP gap. But there is a trick involved in finding a strong 
monetary  effect.  The lag distribution  must  be stretched  and stretched  again; 
the lag coefficients  on monetary  changes fade out to insignificance  only 
after twenty-eight  quarters.  Furthermore,  the estimated  lag distribution  is 
highly  asymmetric  and has a mean lag of seventeen  quarters.  Only 14 per- 
cent of the ultimate  impact of changes  in the growth  rate of the money sup- 
ply has been felt by the end of two years, and only 35 percent  after four 
years.  So the chain  of influences  from  money  to spending  to unemployment 
to wages  to prices  is a lengthy  one. Much of the inertia  lies in the influence 
of unemployment  on wages.4" 
If the effect of monetary  changes on price changes is delayed so long, 
then the policy recommendations  of the monetarists,  usually  based on the 
assumption  of a much  shorter  lag, lose some of their  appeal.45  And it is also 
43. See especially Thomas J. Sargent and Neil Wallace, Rational Expectations  and 
the Theory of Economic Policy, Studies in Monetary Economics 2 (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis, 1975), p. 5. 
44. See my "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery." 
45. Friedman, for instance, has explicitly assumed a lag as short as six months: 
". . . the Fed can and should start at once to slow down monetary growth. That is the 
only way to slow down inflation six months from now.... 
"If the Fed continues its present policy of modest growth in the money stock, we 648  JBrookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
hard  to accept  the conclusion  of the rational-expectation  theorists  that the 
monetary  authority  in principle  has no power  to control  real output. Eco- 
nomic  agents  forming  expectations  rationally  will conclude,  on the basis of 
the  long lags in equation  7.  1, that  monetary  changes  will  have little  effect  on 
prices  and that most of the impact  will fall on real output  in the short  run. 
As a result, adoption of the idea of rational  expectations  has no revolu- 
tionary implications for the theory of  economic policy, a  conclusion 
strongly  in conflict with the recent drift of theoretical  writing  in macro- 
economics. 
In equation  7.2 the money  variable  is supplemented  by all of the variables 
in the basic structural  equation  (equation  3.5). Equation  7.2 serves  mainly 
to demonstrate  the collinearity  of the wage  and  money  variables;  the money 
variable  in 7.2 soaks up somewhat  more than half of the effect  on prices  of 
trend unit labor cost in the basic equation  that excludes  money (compare 
with equation  3.5). The coefficients  on both the relative  price  of investment 
goods and on the ratio of unfilled  orders  to capacity  decline,  but the latter 
retains  significance.  In equation  7.2, as in 7.1, the mean lag on the money- 
supply variable  is seventeen quarters,  supporting  the interpretation  that 
money may be acting  more as a partial  proxy for expected  labor cost than 
as a true demand  variable. 
Although the results  for the subsample  periods are basically  consistent 
with those for the complete  period,  the money-only  reduced-form  equation 
7.3 has the startling  feature  that its standard  error  of estimate  is consider- 
ably below that of the best structural  equation  for the same period (equa- 
tion 3.9). The main reason  is the extra  degrees  of freedom  used  in the struc- 
tural  equation;  the sums of squared  residuals  are almost exactly  the same 
in the money-only  reduced  form as in the no-money  structural  equation.46 
The Disaggregated  Equations 
Price  equations  for the four sectoral  components  of the aggregate  chain 
index  developed  here-durables, nonfood nondurables,  services,  and struc- 
should start seeing results in the near future. .  .  .  The effect will first be on output. 
However, by fall at the latest, the pace of price rise should start coming down." Milton 
Friedman,  "Money and Inflation," Newsweek,  vol. 73 (May 26, 1969), p. 105. 
46. The mean lags on the money variable in equations 7.3-7.6  are, respectively, 
17.7, 24.1, 12.9, and 12.4 quarters. Robert  J. Gordon  649 
tures, all net of energy-as  well as for the food deflator,  are presented  in 
table 8. The sectoral equations do not use the wage rates, productivity- 
trend  estimates,  materials  prices, or demand  variables  that appear  in the 
aggregate  equations; details on the variables  chosen are presented  in the 
notes to table 8 and in appendix  B. The demand-proxy  variables  used are 
the rates of change of the ratio of unfilled  orders  to capacity  (durables); 
nonfood nondurables  utilization, approximated  by the deviation of real 
output of nonfood nondurables  from trend (nonfood nondurables);  the 
gap (services and food); and the real output of the structures  sector 
(structures). 
Table 8 presents  two equations  for each of the five sectors,  one without 
and one with a demand-proxy  variable.  Although  the demand  variables  all 
have the correct sign, they are statistically  insignificant  in the services, 
structures,  and food sectors. In the nonfood nondurables  sector the de- 
mand variable  is significant,  but the equation  including  it (8.4) has exactly 
the same standard  error  as that excluding  it (8.3), indicating  that the de- 
mand  variable  in that sector  simply  substitutes  for other,  nondemand,  vari- 
ables.  In the food sector  the demand  variable  is not significant  by itself, but 
results in a significantly  reduced  standard  error of estimate  indirectly,  by 
changing  coefficients  on other  variables,  particularly  trend  unit  labor  cost.47 
Only  the durables  sector  exhibits  a strong  demand  effect  that both is statis- 
tically significant  and significantly  reduces  the standard  error of estimate 
of the equation. 
One would expect the disaggregated  equations,  taken together,  to yield 
lower  post-sample  predictions  of price  change  than  does the aggregate  equa- 
tion, because  the weighted  average  of the labor-cost  coefficients  in table 8 
(using 1975  expenditure  weights  and excluding  food) is 0.93, as compared 
with 1.09  in the aggregate  core equation.  The productivity-deviation  coeffi- 
cient is significant  only for nonfood nondurables.  The relative  price of in- 
vestment  goods is not significant  anywhere;  its main effect  in the aggregate 
equation  works  through  durables  prices,  but in the equation  for the dura- 
bles sector  the variable  is defined  as the price of investment  goods relative 
to durable  goods, eliminating  its major  movements.  There  is a faint  cost-of- 
capital effect in the services and structures  equations, and strong effects 
from  materials  prices in all sectors  but durables. 
47. Since no separate productivity  estimates are available for services or structures, 
trend unit labor cost for these sectors is approximated  by the rate of change of wages 
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Table 9.  Prediction Errors Using Sectoral and Aggregate Price Equations, 
Various Post-Sample Intervals, 1971:2-1975:3 
Sum of quarterly  rates of change over each interval,  in percentage  points 
1971:2-  1972:4-  1973:3-  1975:1-  1971:2- 
Equation  1972:4  1973:3  1975:1  1975:3  1975:3 
Sectoral equations from 
table 8 
Durables  -3.94  0.27  4.29  -1.52  -0.90 
Nonfood nondurables  -1.37  0.15  7.92  -1.14  5.56 
Services  -2.40  -1.08  1.67  0.66  -1.15 
Structures  2.73  0.51  -0.58  -2.45  0.21 
Weighted  average of 
sectoral equations  -1.83  -0.26  3.15  -0.64  0.42 
Aggregate  core equation from 
table 3, equation 3.6  -3.06  -0.41  4.56  -1.04  0.04 
Addendum:  Food equation  0.54  5.13  9.50  1.85  17.02 
Source:  Derived from equations in tables 3 and 8. 
The benefit  of disaggregation  for predicting  aggregate  price behavior  is 
debatable.  When the actual and predicted  values in the four component 
sectors are combined,  weighted  by their shares  of current-dollar  expendi- 
tures  on nonfood  products  net of energy,  the resulting  average  can be com- 
pared  with the core aggregate  equation,  both for goodness  of fit within  the 
sample  period  and for the characteristics  of the post-sample  extrapolations. 
The variance  left unexplained  by both predicted  series within the sample 
period  is almost  identical,  with  R  equal  to 0.789 for the aggregate  equation 
and 0.781 for the disaggregated  average.  The root mean-square  errors  are, 
respectively,  0.00191 and 0.00193. These differences  are not statistically 
significant. 
Table 9 displays  the difference  between  the actual and predicted  values 
for various  subperiods  of the period  after 1971:2  for the individual  sectoral 
equations,  the weighted  average  of the sectoral  equations,  and  the aggregate 
core equation.  The weighted  average  yields a smaller  estimate  of the effect 
of controls  than  the aggregate  (maximum  effect  of -2.09  versus  -3.47  per- 
cent through 1973:3) and a smaller  post-controls  rebound,  and makes an 
overall underprediction  of the entire post-sample  period slightly smaller 
than that of the aggregate  (0.42 percentage  point versus  0.04). 
The weighted  average,  which tracks the total rate of change of prices 
after 1971:2 quite well, disguises  large  errors  in some of the equations  for 
individual  sectors. While the equation for structures  does relatively  well, Robert  J. Gordon  653 
those for durables  and services  are off by about 1 percentage  point, while 
the equation  for nonfood nondurables  underpredicts  total price  change  by 
5.56 percentage  points.  Price  change  is estimated  to have  been  held down  in 
all sectors  except  structures  during  Phases  I and II (mid-1971  to late 1972); 
then in 1973  the control effect  ended in nonfood manufacturing  but con- 
tinued  in services.  The underprediction  of inflation  in structures  in 1971-72, 
and the overprediction  during  mid-1975,  may represent  evidence  that the 
equation for the structures  sector understates  the demand effect, since 
housing demand  was high in 1972  but weak in 1975. 
The food equation  fitted  to the pre-1971  period  confirms  the impression 
given  by table  2 that the margins  of the farm-to-market  processing  industry 
have widened  in the last four  years  in comparison  with historical  behavior. 
Part  of the problem  may be the low sum of coefficients  on labor and mate- 
rials  cost in the food equation;  estimated  coefficients  from  a sample  period 
in which  raw farm  prices  were  relatively  stable  may not predict  accurately 
when farm  prices  are changing  by very large  amounts. 
The underprediction  of the sectoral  equations  for nonfood nondurables 
during  the post-1971  period  leaves open a role for the "purchasing  power 
parity"  hypothesis  which unties prices from domestic  costs for the subset 
of goods that are traded.  Between 1971:2 and 1973:4, the dollar price of 
exports  from  countries  of the Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and 
Development  other  than the United States,  mainly  industrial  products,  in- 
creased  by 42 percent,  as compared  with increases  of only 11.6  percent  for 
all U.S. goods (including  food and energy) and of only 12.4 percent for 
U.S. nonfood nondurable  goods.48  On this interpretation,  the behavior  of 
prices  of nondurable  goods reported  in table 9 is not at all surprising,  but 
a puzzle  remains:  since durables  can be traded,  why are their  prices over- 
predicted  rather  than underpredicted  for the post-1971  period? 
Conclusions 
The first conclusion  to be drawn  from the analysis  in this paper is that 
any discussion  of price behavior  during  the past four years must begin by 
disentangling  the effects of inflation  in food and energy from the factors 
48. The price index for non-U.S. exports was calculated from data for individual 
countries published in International  Financial  Statistics. I am grateful to my colleague 
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that determine  the prices  of other  outputs.  The total increase  in prices  from 
1971:4  to 1975:3  for private  U.S. final  sales has been 27.3 percent,  but the 
total increase  in nonfood nonenergy  prices has been 22.4 percent,  almost 
one-fifth less. Between mid-1973 and mid-1974, fully 28 percent of the 
increase  in prices  was contributed  by energy  and food. 
Second,  proxy  variables  for the influence  of aggregate  demand  on prices 
(given  wages)  enter  significantly  into the equations  for aggregate  final  sales 
of nonfood products net of energy and into the sectoral equations for 
durable  and nonfood nondurable  goods. On average  during  postwar  busi- 
ness cycles,  the demand  effect  in the aggregate  equation  has raised  the rate 
of inflation  during  the peak quarter  about 2.8 percentage  points above the 
rate in the trough  quarter,  holding  wage change  constant. 
Third,  this aggregate-demand  effect  has shown  no sign of weakening  dur- 
ing the postwar  period.  Tests of structural  shift indicate  that the effect  was 
stronger  during  the 1963-71  period than during  the 1954-62  period. This 
conclusion  is qualified  to the extent that the relative  price of investment 
goods is acting as a proxy for demand  in the earlier  period. 
Fourth,  the relative  price of investment  goods is the only component  of 
the relative  price of capital  services  that has a correctly  signed  and signifi- 
cant effect  on price  markups.  Even  here,  one suspects  that the variable  may 
be acting  as another  demand  proxy,  rather  than  as a component  of the rela- 
tive price  of capital  services.  There  is a faint hint of a positive  coefficient  on 
the cost of capital  in the sectoral  equations  for services  and structures. 
Fifth, a reduced-form  relationship  between  the rate of change of prices 
and money performs  surprisingly  well in competition  with the structural 
price-markup  equation  but only by allowing  lags in the effect  of money on 
prices  that are much  longer  than those usually  assumed  in journalistic  dis- 
cussions of public policy; the lag effect estimated  here stretches  out over 
seven  years,  with a mean  of over four  years.  Neither  policymakers  nor their 
advisers should be intimidated  by those who claim that an attempt to 
stimulate  temporarily  rapid  growth  in real output  by a temporary  accelera- 
tion in the money supply  would simply  raise  prices.  Economic  agents  may 
be perfectly  well aware  of what the Federal  Reserve  is doing, but they do 
not translate  their knowledge  into instantaneous  changes  in prices, either 
downward  in the wake of Fed restriction,  such as in 1969-70 or 1974-75, 
or upward.  The reduced-form  regression  of inflation  on the rate of change 
in the money  supply  confirms  the predominant  influence  of inertia  on price- 
setting  behavior  evident  in previous  structural  wage-price  models. Robert  J. Gordon  655 
Sixth, the aggregate  equation  for nonfood products  net of energy,  when 
extrapolated  after the end of its sample period in mid-1971,  confirms  my 
earlier  conclusion  that the U.S. price controls  held down the price  level by 
a maximum  of 3.5 to 5.1 percent,  depending  on the initial date chosen for 
the sample  period. All of the control effect was reversed  during 1974-75, 
and the price  level is now within  one-half  percentage  point of the level pre- 
dicted  in the absence  of controls. 
Seventh,  the disaggregated  sectoral  equations  indicate  that the price  con- 
trols  held  down  prices  in all sectors  but structures  and  food during  1971-72; 
but in 1973  the effect  was reversed  everywhere  but in services. 
Eighth,  it is impossible  to test formally  for the influence  of foreign  prices 
in U.S. data, because  the data are contaminated  by the imposition  and un- 
winding  of controls. Since the United States devalued  during  the control 
period,  adherents  of the purchasing-power-parity  hypothesis  would expect 
to find positive  unexplained  residuals  in the post-control  period for traded 
goods but not for nontraded  goods. No such  pattern  emerges  in the extrap- 
olations of the disaggregated  sectoral equations, with positive residuals 
for nonfood nondurables  but negative  residuals  for durable  goods. 
Finally, perhaps  the most surprising  conclusion  is that, overall, outside 
of food and energy, aggregate  price behavior  since mid-1971  contains no 
puzzle that cannot be explained by equations estimated for a  sample 
period ending in mid-1971. 656  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
APPENDIX  A 
Energy and Food Adjustments: 
Methodology and Data 
THIS  APPENDIX  lists the methodology  and data used in making the adjust- 
ments for energy and food prices. 
Energy 
DIRECT  PURCHASES  OF ENERGY  BY  CONSUMERS,  CURRENT  AND 
CONSTANT  DOLLARS 
Nondurables-gasoline  and motor  oil:  1952:1-1975:3,  quarterly,  ob- 
tained from an unpublished computer printout (and telephone updates for 
1975) supplied by the U.S.  Bureau of Economic Analysis;  1947:1-1951:4, 
annual data from the national income  accounts,  tables 2.5 and 2.6, con- 
verted to  quarterly data by interpolation.  Data  for national  income  ac- 
counts  are  published  in  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  The National 
Income and Product Accounts of the United States,  1929-1965:  Statistical 
Tables (1966) and Survey of Current  Business. 
Nondurables-heating  oil and otherfuel: 1958:1-1975: 3, same as gasoline 
and motor  oil  for  1952:1-1975:3;  1947:1-1957:4,  same as gasoline  and 
motor oil for 1947:1-1951:4. 
Services-electricity  and natural gas:  1974:1-1975:3,  same as gasoline 
and motor  oil for  1952: 1-1975:3;  1947:1-1973:4,  same as gasoline  and 
motor oil for 1947:1-1951:4. 
INDIRECT  PURCHASES  OF ENERGY  BY  PRODUCERS 
In constant 1967 dollars. The basic source was the 1967 U.S.  input-out- 
put table published in Survey of Current  Business, vol. 54 (February 1974), 
pp. 38-43. All input from columns 7 (coal mining), 31 (petroleum refining), Robert  J. Gordon  657 
and 68 (electric,  gas, water, and sanitary  services  utilities)  into industries 
1-6, 9-30, and  32-77 were  counted  on the first  round.  Then  the energy  com- 
ponent of purchases  of these industries  from each other was calculated. 
The  first  and subsequent  rounds  yielded  the total dollar  value  in 1967  of the 
energy  component  of sales by all nonenergy  industries  to the final-output 
sector,  both in the form of direct  energy  purchases  from industries  7, 31, 
and 68, and of energy  purchases  of all nonenergy-supplying  industries  (in- 
dustries  1-6, 9-30, and 32-77). These industries  were allocated  to the five 
sectors  as follows:49 
Sector  Industries  1967 energy  share 
Durables  20-23,  36-63,  69  0.0335 
Food  1-4, 14-15,  69  0.0434 
Nonfood  nondurables  16-19,  27-30,  32-34,  69  0.0439 
Services  24-26,  65-67,  71-77  0.0363 
Structures  11-12  0.0446 
In constant  1958  dollars. The energy  shares  listed in the previous  section 
were multiplied  by 1958 constant-dollar  sectoral  final sales, from the na- 
tional income accounts,  table 1.5 (the split between  food and nonfood is 
explained  below). 
In current dollars. The  1958 constant-dollar sectoral totals were multi- 
plied by the wholesale  price index of the U.S. Bureau  of Labor Statistics 
for "fuels  and related  products,  and power,"  rebased  to 1958. 
OIL IMPORTS 
In current dollars.  1973:2-1974:3,  from George L. Perry, "The United 
States,"  in Edward R. Fried and Charles L. Schultze, eds., Higher Oil 
Prices  and the World  Economy:  The  Adjustment  Problem  (Brookings  Insti- 
tution, 1975),  table 2-4, p. 82; 1974:4-1975:3, Survey  of Current  Business, 
vol. 55 (October 1975),  p. S-23. 
In constant  dollars. 1973:2-1973:4, Perry's  series on barrels  of oil im- 
ported,  "The  United States"  (table 2-1, p. 75, column  C), multiplied  by the 
49. Retail and wholesale trade (69) was allocated among sectors as follows: durable 
and nondurable goods were assumed to have equal markups-that  is, the durables- 
nondurables split in total trade value added was assumed to be proportional to the 
purchases  made by the final-output sector from the two manufacturing  sectors. The 
food-nonfood split within nondurables was based on  the assumption that nonfood 
markups  were double those in the food sector. 658  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1975 
average 1974 ratio of real oil imports to Perry's  series on barrels  of oil 
imported; 1974:1-1975:3,  current-dollar value divided by price index (see 
below). 
Price index.  1973:2-1973:4,  the price index equals current-dollar  value 
divided by constant-dollar  value; 1974:1-1975:3, unit-value index, all 
petroleum  imports (not available quarterly  before 1974:1), obtained by 
telephone  from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Foreign Trade Division, 
converted  to 1958  dollars  by dividing  the census  index  (base year 1972),  by 
the implicit  price deflator  (1958 =  1.0) in 1972  for gasoline  and motor oil, 
from the national  income accounts,  tables 2.5 and 2.6. 
FINAL  SALES NET  OF ENERGY  IN  CURRENT  AND  CONSTANT  DOLLARS 
From final  sales  in each sector  (national  income  accounts,  tables 1.3 and 
1.5, with nondurables  split into food and nonfood as described  below) was 
subtracted  the sum of direct  energy  purchases  (nonfood nondurables  and 
services  only) and indirect  energy  purchases  (all sectors).  To this difference 
was added  oil imports  in the nonfood  nondurables  sector  only. The current- 
dollar and constant-dollar  series  for each sector, and aggregates  including 
and excluding  food, are displayed  in table A-1. 
Food 
Quarterly  consumer  expenditures  on food and beverages  in current  and 
constant  dollars  for the period 1952:1-1975:3 were obtained  from an un- 
published  computer  printout supplied by the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (and telephone  updates for 1975). Quarterly  figures  for 1947-52 
were  obtained  by interpolating  between  annual  figures  from  the national  in- 
come accounts,  tables 2.5 and 2.6. This series was converted  into a final- 
sales  series  by the addition  of food exports  and subtraction  of food imports. 
Current-dollar  values  and  unit-value  indexes  of U.S. exports  and imports 
of crude and manufactured  food and beverages  were obtained  from U.S. 
Bureau  of the Census, Foreign Trade Division, Indexes of U.S. Exports 
and Imports by Economic Class: 1919 to 1971 (1972). Before 1958 the series 
are  available  annually  in this publication  and were  converted  into quarterly 
series by interpolation.  Quarterly  series for 1958:1-1971:4 were copied Ch  t  t  ooo n  0af  ot 
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from the publication, and quarterly  series for 1972:1-1975:3 were ob- 
tained  by telephone  from the Foreign  Trade  Division. 
Nonfood nondurables  final sales were obtained by the subtraction  of 
consumer  food expenditures  plus exports  minus  imports  from  nondurables 
final sales (national  income accounts,  tables 1.3 and 1.5). 
APPENDIX  B 
Definitions of  Variables 
and Sources of Data 
Definitions  of Variables 
ALL VARIABLES  are  expressed  as quarterly  rates  of change.  See  next section 





variable  Definition of level of variable  Source (NBER  Code) 
GAP  Ratio of GNP gap to potential out-  NBER 
put  (GNPGAP/GNPPOT) 
h  Ratio of indirect  tax liability  to per-  NBER 
sonal consumption  (GTXL/GAE) 
j  Tax component  of the price  of capital  Hickman-Coen 
services 
M1  Currency  plus demand  deposits  NBER (FMS) 
n  Real price of capital services  =  r + j +  (pk -  p) 
p  Net-of-energy  price indexes  See appendix  A 
pk-p  Ratio of the implicit  deflator  for non-  NBER 
residential investment to  the im-  (GDIN/GDP) 
plicit deflator for private product 
q  Aggregate: nonfarm private out-  NBER(LOUTU) 





variable  Definition of level of variable  Source (NBER  Code) 
Manufacturing:  manufacturing  NBER (LOUTM) 
output per manhour 
q*  Trend rate of growth of output per  Estimated coefficients  in 
manhour  regression  equations, 
see note 32 above 
r  Cost of  capital: prime commercial  NBER (FYCP) 
paper  rate  plus Hickman-Coen  de- 
preciation  rate 
UFK  Ratio of unfilled orders to capacity  BCD, series  850 times 
in durable  goods, computed  as the  852 
product of the ratio  of unfilled  or- 
ders to shipments  and the rate of 
capacity  utilization 
v  Aggregate, durables, nonfood non-  NBER (PSMAT) 
durables, services: index of spot- 
market  prices  for thirteen  raw ma- 
terials 
Food: wholesale  price  index  for  crude  BLS 
foodstuffs  and feedstuffs 
w  Aggregate:  nonfarm  private  compen-  NBER (LCPU) 
sation per manhour, 
times adjusted  hourly  earnings,  RJG 
divided  by unadjusted  hourly  earn-  NBER (LEH) 
ings 
Manufacturing:  manufacturing  pri-  NBER (LCPM) 
vate compensation  per manhour, 
times manufacturing  adjusted  NBER (LEMXS) 
hourly earnings, 
divided by  manufacturing  unad-  NBER (LEHM) 
justed hourly earnings 
Services: 1964-75-hourly  earnings  NBER (LEHS) 




change  of 
variable  Definition of level of variable  Source (NBER  Code) 
1947-63-hourly earnings  in  NBER (LE6HTW) 
wholesale  trade 
Structures:  Hourly earnings  in con-  NBER (LE6HCC) 
struction 
XN  Real net-of-energy  output  in nonfood  Appendix  A 
nondurables  (deviation  from  trend) 
XS  Real net-of-energy  output in struc-  Appendix  A 
tures 
Sources  of Data 
Abbreviation  Definition 
BLS  Unpublished  tabulation  of historical  data obtained  from 
U.S. Bureau  of Labor Statistics 
BCD  Business  Conditions  Digest 
Hickman-Coen B. G. Hickman and R. M. Coen, An Annual Growth 
Model of the U.S. Economy  (Amsterdam:  North-Hol- 
land, 1976), and unpublished  data printout obtained 
from R. M. Coen 
NBER  NBER data tape, as maintained  at Northwestern  Uni- 
versity  computer  center 
RJG  Robert J. Gordon, "Inflation  in Recession and Recov- 
ery," BPEA, 1:1971, appendix  C, updated  by NBER 
series  LEPXS Comments  and 
Discussion 
William  D. Nordhaus:  Robert  Gordon's  latest paper  on price  behavior  up- 
dates his earlier work and presents some interesting  new material. His 
major conclusions,  which appear  justified by his econometric  equations, 
are three: First, it appears  that demand  has a significant  effect on prices 
through  the impact  not only on materials  prices  and labor costs, as others 
have found, but also on the markup of prices over standard  costs. The 
latest version (table 3, equation 3.4) shows that the total effect operating 
through  the markup  is about one-third  of the quantity  response, so that 
of a cyclical  rise in nominal  income,  about  three-fourths  ends up in higher 
output and one-fourth  in higher  prices. 
Although  Gordon's  basic conclusion  seems buttressed  by his equations, 
I admit that I am only partially  convinced.  In his disaggregated  results,  a 
slightly  fishy smell emerges  since the only significant  demand  effects  turn 
up in durable  goods. In durables  and nondurables,  I compared  Gordon's 
results with those of Eckstein  and Wyss (tables 2 and 5), and had some 
trouble  reconciling  them. Finally,  I must say that I am experiencing  vertigo 
from  the list of demand  variables  used to explain  the cyclical  sensitivity  of 
prices.  When I reviewed  eight studies  in 1970,  I noted  that  eleven  different 
demand  variables  were used with virtually  no overlap. Chateau  Gordon 
vintage  1970  used  the new orders-to-sales  ratio  and  the "employment  rate," 
but Chateau Gordon 1971 used a different  grape-the  ratio of unfilled 
orders  to capacity. Chateau  Gordon 1975 contains  two different  demand 
indexes  (the ratio  of unfilled  orders  to capacity  and  the GNP gap) and  these 
are run in both levels and differences.' 
1. These are references to  Gordon's papers in BPEA, 1:1970, pp. 8-41;  1:1971, 
pp. 105-58; and this paper. 
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This rapid  turnover  of demand  variables  makes  me suspicious  that what 
is operating  are good Darwinian  principles  rather  than good econometric 
principles;  the demand  variables  that have survived  to 1975  clearly  illus- 
trate selection of the fittest. Gordon was candid in 1971 when he stated 
that "the measure  [the ratio of unfilled  orders  to capacity]  is used here in 
preference to the ratio of new orders to shipments . .  . because the latter 
...  has little correlation  with price behavior  after 1951"  (p. 128). What 
is the interpretation  of a specification  that is chosen to maximize  the t-sta- 
tistic on the demand  variable?  Instead,  the results  should be tested with a 
Darwinian  t-statistic.  It takes  into account  the large  number  of regressions 
that are extinct for every one that survives.  For example,  if the surviving 
species  represent  50 percent  of the extinct,  under  independence  assumptions 
a significant  t-statistic  should be four rather  than two. By the standard  of 
the Darwinian t-statistic, Gordon's demand variables  are insignificant. 
Coming  back to the main theme, Gordon correctly  identifies  the short- 
run flexibility  of prices  as one of the major  elements  in the new theory of 
why macroeconomic  policy is bound to fail. Whether  the exact fraction  of 
the increase  in nominal  income  that ends  up in prices  is only 1 percent  or as 
much as 30 percent,  it is certainly  way below the 100  percent  that this the- 
ory seems to require.  Gordon makes much of this critique  of the Lucas- 
Sargent-Wallace  theory of the effectiveness  of policy. In addition,  I would 
emphasize  the asymmetry  in knowledge  between  the Federal  Reserve  and 
my grandmother-in-law-without  committing  myself about whose judg- 
ment is better. 
The second  major  result  of the Gordon  paper  concerns  the effects  of the 
price controls since August 1971.  Using the prediction  from the 1975-vin- 
tage equation,  Gordon  predicts  the movement  in prices  over  the period.  He 
concludes  that by the end of the period  (third  quarter  of 1975)  the level of 
prices  was on track.  This seems  consistent  with the fact that profit  margins 
in nonenergy  products,  cyclically  corrected,  have not taken  a dive over  the 
five-year  period. His preferred  equation shows a horrendous  set of post- 
sample errors, and the conclusion is either that Gordon's equation falls 
apart, or-and  this is Gordon's hypothesis-that price controls were re- 
sponsible  for depressing  margins  in the period  from 1971:2  to 1973:3, and 
that removing  them led to recovery  of margins  from 1973:3 to 1975:3. 
I tend to accept  Gordon's  verdict  that  price  controls  were  responsible  for 
the wild fluctuations  in the markup,  but I admit  to some nervousness.  I am 
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timing  of controls  does not coincide  with the Gordon  residuals.  For exam- 
ple, he finds  continual  depression  of margins  during  the Phase III period, 
when many economic  pundits,  including  some in this room, were arguing 
that Phase  III was actually  leading  to a profit surge  and to virtually  com- 
plete decontrol.  Most of Gordon's decontrol  effect comes in the last half 
of 1974,  well after legal decontrol  had taken place. 
More generally,  the methodology  that Gordon  and others  use to test for 
incomes  policies is inadequate.  Can't economists  be more creative  than to 
use dummy variables?  Why can't we model price controls and test that 
model explicitly? 
The third  major result is, in fact, also a major surprise,  at least to me. 
This  is the finding  that  changes  in the money  supply  predict  inflation  almost 
as well as Gordon's best 1975-vintage  price equation. The bit of cork in 
the wine is that Gordon has had to stretch the Almon lag so far that it 
touches its tail-seven  full years. 
That some such equation  should work is no surprise.  In a reduced-form 
price  equation,  money  enters  along with exports,  defense  expenditures,  and 
so on. The puzzle  is that omission  of other  exogenous  variables  and of over- 
identifying  restrictions  doesn't make the reduced-form  equation  worthless. 
I don't know the solution  to the puzzle. A glance  at the data suggests  that 
the answer  may be that the inflation  rate has only one long and one short 
cycle, and these are essentially  all the money-supply  variable  is picking  up. 
Since Gordon's money variable  really has five separate  coefficients  (four 
polynomial  terms  plus the lag), its ability  to track  the inflation  rate pretty 
well may be less surprising.  In addition,  given the thousands  of regressions 
of prices  on money supply  that probably  have been run over the last dec- 
ade, the proper  Darwinian  t-statistic  would deflate  the significance  of the 
results.  A final possibility  is that Gordon has misspecified  the structural 
equation, and that the money supply is a proxy for some of the omitted 
variables. 
All in all, Gordon's  paper  provides  a good deal of insight  into the infla- 
tionary  process. I welcome  his attempt  to disaggregate  and give the poor 
exhausted  nonfarm  deflator  a little time on the bench. The major uncer- 
tainties  left hanging  by Gordon's  study  will probably  require  much  more of 
this work. 
Charles  L. Schultze: Gordon's aggregate  price index, before  he subtracts 
food and energy,  matches  very  closely  the movements  of the official  private 
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sectoral  indexes  that Gordon  uses are, however,  very  curious  constructions 
for analytic  purposes.  In constructing  the deflator  for final  sales of durables 
and nondurables,  durable and nondurable  imports are subtracted  from 
both current-  and constant-dollar  sales. Although  nondurable  imports  are 
used by both durable and nondurable  domestic industries,  their entire 
value is subtracted  from the nondurables  sector. Durable imports are 
treated  similarly.  Hence, the resulting  deflators  are a strange  hybrid and 
not a "true"  value-added  deflator. 
Gordon  calculates  that the relative  rise  in the gross  margin  between  farm 
prices and food prices accounts  for an additional 1.93 points of the price 
rise  between  1973:  1 and 1975:2.  Gordon  argues  that the large  rise  in food- 
marketing  margins  is special,  and should be subtracted  from an aggregate 
index  before  fitting  macro  price-determination  equations.  I have two prob- 
lems with this. First, a substantial  part of the farm-to-market  spread  and 
the value of inputs  to farming  arises  in the transportation,  packaging,  and 
a wide range of other industries,  whose contributions  to inflation  should 
not be subtracted  out. Second,  by comparing  his deflator  for food and bev- 
erage prices to the deflator  for gross farm product,  he arrives  at the esti- 
mate, cited above, of a 1.93  point contribution  of food-marketing  margins 
to the rise in the nonfarm  deflator.  But the composition  and derivation  of 
the gross farm product deflator  is not comparable  to those of the food 
deflator.  Using a set of indexes  explicitly  constructed  by the Department  of 
Agriculture  to measure  the gross food-marketing  margin,'  I estimate  that 
the relative  increase  in gross food margins  contributed  1.1, not 1.9, points 
to the deflator over the relevant period. In short, I question whether 
Gordon's  nonfood nonenergy  index  captures  the rate of price  increase  that 
has to be explained. 
I also have some problems  with his excess-demand  variable.  He explains 
what margin is left to  be explained by his excess-demand  variables- 
unfilled  orders  relative  to sales in the durable-goods  industry  multiplied  by 
the ratio of manufacturing  output to capacity, detrended.  Now, unfilled 
orders  in durable  goods are heavily dominated  by three industries:  non- 
electrical  machinery,  electrical  machinery,  and transportation  equipment 
except motor vehicles account for some two-thirds  of the unfilled  orders, 
but produce  less than 10 percent of the private  nonfarm  value added. So 
Gordon is wagging  a large dog by an awfully  small tail. 
1. U.  S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Marketing and 
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The fundamental  element on which Gordon's conclusions  hinge is his 
selection of this excess-demand  variable, AUFK,  which, after being run 
through  his equations,  exhibits  the following  properties  (see figure  2): (1) 
the contribution  of excess  demand  to price-wage  margins  was substantially 
less in 1968-69 than it was in 1963-66; (2) the contribution  of excess de- 
mand as late in the recession  as the third quarter  of 1974  was much larger 
than it was in  1968-69, and was exceeded in only two other quarters 
between 1956  and 1972; and (3) the trough of the demand  variable's  con- 
tribution  to prices was higher in the 1974-75 recession  than in any other 
recession of the postwar period, save 1960-61. If one believes that the 
ratio of unfilled  orders  to capacity  in three  major  durable-goods  industries 
is a good proxy for economy-wide  excess demand,  and if one accepts  the 
lag structure  that emerges from Gordon's equations, the conclusion is 
inevitable:  during 1974, as the economy was sliding into the worst reces- 
sion of thirty  years,  excess  demand  was continuing  to put upward  pressure 
on prices. 
R. J. Gordon:  Responding  to Nordhaus'  comments,  I do not see that there 
is any inconsistency  between  my results  and those of Eckstein  and Wyss. 
While the two papers are not directly  comparable,  because  Eckstein  and 
Wyss did not use the ratio of unfilled  orders  to capacity  and either  did not 
allow demand  variables  to enter  with a lag or constrained  the lag to be the 
same as on other independent  variables,  nevertheless  they found strong 
demand  effects,  particularly  for durables  (see the results  for the utilization 
rate in their table 6). Nordhaus' attempt with the "Darwinian  statistic" 
concept  to deflate  the significance  of the demand  coefficients  in the present 
paper  is incorrect  since the basic demand  variable  in this paper  (A  UFK)  is 
exactly  the same as that used in the 1971  paper.  Other  alternative  demand 
variables  have been included  in table 3 simply to show that the demand 
effect  is robust  to the choice of demand  proxies,  and none of the four alter- 
native proxies in table 3 is rendered  "extinct"-that is, statistically  insig- 
nificant. Finally, Nordhaus' criticism  of the price-controls  methodology 
implies that dummy  variables  have been used; in fact, all sample  periods 
ended  in 1971:2  precisely  to avoid the use of dummy  variables  to estimate 
the effect of controls. 
In response  to Schultze,  the difference  of 1.93  percentage  points between 
our two price indexes is contributed  by the "food minus farm" sector 
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ence consists  not only of the gross margin  between  farm prices and food 
prices-for example,  labor, transportation,  and packaging  costs-but  also 
of the inputs  purchased  by farmers.  If Schultze  has calculated  that 1.1  per- 
centage  points of the 1.93 can be attributed  to food-marketing  margins, 
then the remainder  must have been contributed  by the costs of farm  inputs. 
As to  Schultze's reservations  about the excess-demand  proxy variable, 
AUFK, the dominance  of three  industries  in the data  on unfilled  orders  does 
not necessarily  raise problems  if the unobservable  excess demand  for the 
products  of other industries  is positively  correlated  with unfilled  orders  in 
these three industries.  Finally, for those who are still unwilling  to accept 
AUFK, let me call attention  to table 3, equation 3.4, in which the rate of 
change of the GNP gap appears as a significant  demand proxy, with a 
t-statistic  of -4.37. 
General  Discussion 
Robert  Hall was pleased  to see that the effect  of demand  upon aggregate 
prices had finally  been empirically  verified,  and he thought further  work 
would uncover  an even greater  demand  elasticity  than Gordon estimated. 
In his view, a surge  in demand  should meet a fairly  inelastic  supply in the 
short run due to the fixity of capital,  thus running  prices  up and giving a 
short-run  price  elasticity  in the neighborhood  of 0.4. In the long run,  supply 
should  flatten  out, cutting  the price  elasticity.  But Lawrence  Krause  ques- 
tioned Hall's scenario  for an open economy, since short-run  capital con- 
straints  on domestic  output  can be relieved  by imports  from  abroad,  giving 
a flatter  marginal  cost curve  and a lower  price  elasticity.  And George  Perry 
noted that the presence  of cyclically  underutilized  capital  would also alter 
such a calculation.  Hall agreed, but thought the extreme  position of an 
infinitely  elastic short-run  supply  curve-that  some researchers  found and 
that  Nordhaus'  skepticism  of Gordon's  modest  price  effects  implied-could 
not be achieved  through  imports. 
Paul Samuelson  found that the price  equation  lacked  theoretical  under- 
pinning.  Steady-state  prices  in a time-phased  Leontief-Sraffa  system, with 
labor and perhaps some raw materials  taken as primary  inputs, can be 
defined  for each given steady-state  profit rate. They can be computed as 
the "dual, price" function of the steady-state  primary  factor and final 
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addition  of the profit  rate.  It was not clear  that Gordon's  empirical  specifi- 
cation would be implied by such a model or that it was adequate  for the 
real, multisector  world that was being examined. 
Christopher  Sims remarked  that Gordon's attempt  to explain inflation 
by the past money supply did not test or reject  the rational-expectations 
model with which Gordon associated it. A rational-expectations  model 
with a one-period  information  delay always  implies that monetary  policy 
has no systematic  impact on real quantities,  yet such a model is consistent 
with  an arbitrarily  long mean  lag in regressions  of prices  on money.  Indeed, 
natural  assumptions  on the serial-correlation  properties  of the money sup- 
ply make such a long mean lag likely in these models. Thus, the simplest 
and most extreme  rational-expectations  models are consistent  with Gor- 
don's findings.  Gordon agreed  with Sims  that, in principle,  there  were  two 
possible  interpretations  of the long lag between  monetary  growth  and price 
change.  Either  (1) real output  reacts  only to monetary  surprises,  and prices 
lag behind money as long as the actual and expected  rates of monetary 
growth diverge; or (2) a sluggish  price-adjustment  structure  allows even 
fully comprehended  monetary  changes to constrain behavior and affect 
real output. Gordon supported  the second interpretation,  both because  it 
was  more  consistent  with the 1974-75  recession,  and because  recent  tests of 
the first  interpretation  had yielded  such short  money-to-price  lags. Samuel- 
son pointed out that a reduced  form of the kind of model that most econ- 
omists  think  of would  look a lot like Gordon's  estimated  equation  between 
money and prices.  In the longest run, the standard  model is homogeneous 
of degree  zero in terms of real output and homogeneous  of degree  one in 
terms of every  price. Over a very long time, this model explains  the price 
level on the basis of the money supply, and the only possibly surprising 
thing about Gordon's  result  is that he finds, over so long a lag period,  no 
exogenous shifts in velocity that require  special explanation.  But such a 
model has no useful  predictive  or prescriptive  properties  for the short run 
when real output is not fixed. 
Sims  pointed to Gordon's  finding  that demand  influences  prices as evi- 
dence  that simultaneous-equations  bias exists in simple price or wage re- 
gressions.  With  both prices  and wages  influenced  by demand,  Gordon's  use 
of single-equation  methods  is inappropriate  for estimating  the price  equa- 
tion. Gordon  noted, however,  that  identification  of a structural  price  equa- 
tion was still possible if the demand  effect in the wage equation was rela- 
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Perry shared  the doubts Charles  Schultze  had about the food adjust- 
ment Gordon made. He found the difference  between  Gordon's findings 
and Schultze's  in BPEA, 2:1975 too large to associate simply with food 
processing,  distribution,  and farm  inputs. Since  the energy  adjustment  has 
already been made in a separate calculation, the 0.8 percentage  point 
residual  (Gordon's  1.9  points  less the 1.1  points attributable  to the farm-to- 
market spread),  which must come from farm inputs, seems surprisingly 
high, amounting  to about $8 billion. What is more, all of the 1.9 percent- 
age point spread  that is attributable  to wages is already  in the aggregate 
wage-cost  variable.  If these wage costs rose exceptionally  fast, they incor- 
rectly  help "predict"  an extraordinary  rise in the nonfood price deflator. 
Arthur  Okun  voiced some doubts about the treatment  of raw-materials 
prices.  Statistically,  entering  them as the difference  from  the left-hand  vari- 
able  seemed  likely  to bias  the estimated  coefficient  toward  zero.  In addition, 
some raw materials are imported and some are domestically  produced 
and are  thus a part of the left-hand  variable  being  explained.  The estimated 
coefficient  on this hybrid variable  was thus serving to measure different 
structural  relations.  Okun  would  have preferred  a clearer  variable  or set of 
variables  measuring  raw-materials  prices, with their effects estimated  di- 
rectly  rather  than as differences  from the dependent  variable  in the equa- 
tion. He also noted that the estimated  lags on wage cost were larger  than 
he would have expected; if the true lags were much shorter,  this might 
explain  why  Gordon  estimates  such  a strong  demand  effect  in his equations. 